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Computing a Pessimistic Leader-Follower
Equilibrium with Multiple Followers: the
Mixed-Pure Case
Stefano Coniglio ¨ Nicola Gatti ¨ Alberto
Marchesi
Abstract The search problem of computing a leader-follower equilibrium (also
referred to as an optimal strategy to commit to) has been widely investigated
in the scientific literature in, almost exclusively, the single-follower setting. Al-
though the optimistic and pessimistic versions of the problem, i.e., those where
the single follower breaks any ties among multiple equilibria either in favour or
against the leader, are solved with different methodologies, both cases allow
for efficient, polynomial-time algorithms based on linear programming. The
situation is different with multiple followers, where results are only sporadic
and depend strictly on the nature of the followers’ game.
In this paper, we investigate the setting of a normal-form game with a single
leader and multiple followers who, after observing the leader’s commitment,
play a Nash equilibrium. The corresponding search problem, both in the opti-
mistic and pessimistic versions, is known to be not in Poly-APX unless P “ NP
and exact algorithms are known only for the optimistic case. We focus on the
case where the followers play in pure strategies—a restriction that applies to
a number of real-world scenarios and which, in principle, makes the problem
easier—under the assumption of pessimism (as it is easy to show, the opti-
mistic version of the problem can be straightforwardly solved in polynomial
Stefano Coniglio
University of Southampton, University Road, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK
Tel.: +44-023-8059-4546
E-mail: s.coniglio@soton.ac.uk
Nicola Gatti
Politecnico di Milano, piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, Milano, 20133, Italy
Tel.: +39-02-2399-3658
Fax.: +39-02-2399-3411
E-mail: nicola.gatti@polimi.it
Alberto Marchesi
Politecnico di Milano, piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, Milano, 20133, Italy
Tel.: +39-02-2399-9685
Fax.: +39-02-2399-3411
E-mail: alberto.marchesi@polimi.it
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
01
43
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  4
 A
ug
 20
18
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time). After casting this search problem as a pessimistic bilevel programming
problem, we show that, with two followers, the problem is NP-hard and, with
three or more followers, it is not in Poly-APX unless P “ NP. This last result
matches the inapproximability result which holds for the unrestricted case and
shows that, differently from what happens in the optimistic version, hardness
in the pessimistic problem is not due to the adoption of mixed strategies. We
then show that the problem admits, in the general case, a supremum but not
a maximum, and we propose a single-level mathematical programming refor-
mulation which calls for the maximisation of a nonconcave quadratic function
over an unbounded nonconvex feasible region defined by linear and quadratic
constraints. Since, due to admitting a supremum but not a maximum, only a
restricted version of this formulation can be solved to optimality with state-of-
the-art methods, we propose an exact ad hoc algorithm, which we also embed
within a branch-and-bound scheme, capable of computing the supremum of the
problem and, for cases where there is no leader’s strategy where such value is
attained, also an α-approximate strategy where α ą 0 is an arbitrary additive
loss. We conclude the paper by evaluating the scalability of our algorithms via
computational experiments on a well-established testbed of game instances.
Keywords Leader-follower games ¨ Stackelberg equilibria ¨ Pessimistic
bilevel programming
1 Introduction
In recent years, Leader-Follower (or Stackelberg) Games (LFGs) and their cor-
responding Leader-Follower Equilibria (LFEs) have attracted a growing inter-
est in many disciplines, including theoretical computer science, artificial intel-
ligence, and operations research. LFGs describe situations where one player
(the leader) commits to a strategy and the other players (the followers) first
observe the leader’s commitment and, then, decide how to play. In the litera-
ture, LFEs are often referred to as optimal strategies (for the leader) to commit
to. LFGs encompass a broad array of real-world games. A prominent example
is that one of security games, where a defender, acting as a leader, is tasked
to allocate scarce resources to protect valuable targets from an attacker, act-
ing as a follower [2, 11, 18]. Besides the security domain, applications can be
found in, among others, interdiction games [6, 13], toll-setting problems [12],
and network routing [1].
While, to the best of our knowledge, the majority of the game theoretical
investigations on the computation of LFEs assumes the presence of a single
follower, we address, in this work, the multi-follower case.
When facing an LFG and, in particular, a multi-follower one, two aspects
need to be considered: the type of game (induced by the leader’s strategy) the
followers play and, in it, how ties among the multiple equilibria which could
arise are broken.
As to the nature of the followers’ game, and restricting ourselves to the
cases which look more natural, the followers may play hierarchically one at a
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time, as in a hierarchical Stackelberg game [9], simultaneously and coopera-
tively [8], or simultaneously and noncooperatively [3].
As to breaking ties among multiple equilibria, it is natural to consider two
cases: the optimistic one, where the followers end up playing an equilibrium
which maximises the leader’s utility, and the pessimistic one, where they end
up playing an equilibrium by which the leader’s utility is minimised. Note that
we are not assuming, here, that the followers could agree on an optimistic or
pessimistic equilibrium in a practical application. Rather, the optimistic and
pessimistic cases allow for the computation of the tightest range of values the
leader’s utility may take without making any assumptions on which equilib-
rium the followers would actually end up playing. From this perspective, while
an optimistic LFE accounts for the best case for the leader, a pessimistic LFE
accounts for the worst case. In this sense, the computation of a pessimistic
LFE is paramount in realistic scenarios as, differently from an optimistic one,
the former is robust. As we will see, though, this degree of robustness comes at
a high computational price, as computing a pessimistic LFE is a much harder
task than computing its optimistic counterpart.
1.1 Leader-Follower Nash Equilibria
Throughout the paper, we will focus on the case of normal-form games where,
after the leader’s commitment to a strategy, the followers play simultaneously
and noncooperatively, reaching a Nash equilibrium. We refer to the correspond-
ing equilibrium as Leader-Follower Nash Equilibrium (LFNE).
In particular, we consider the case where the followers are restricted to pure
strategies. This restriction is motivated by some reasons. First, the problem of
finding an NE in mixed strategies, a subproblem of that of finding an LFNE,
is already hard with two or more players (which clearly implies the hardness of
finding an LFNE in mixed strategies)—differently from the problem of com-
puting an NE in pure strategies, which can be solved in polynomial time. Thus,
the study of the case where followers play pure strategies does not appear di-
rect and could allow one to characterise more accurately the tractability of
the problem. Secondly, many games admit pure-strategy NEs, among which
potential games [15], congestion games [19], and toll-setting problems [12].
The same also holds, with high probability, in many unstructured games (see
Subsection 3.3).
1.2 Original Contributions
After briefly pointing out that an optimistic LFNE (with followers restricted to
pure strategies) can be computed efficiently (in polynomial time) by a mixture
of enumeration and linear programming, we entirerly devote the remainder of
the paper to the pessimistic case (with, again, followers restricted to pure
strategies). In terms of computational complexity, we show that, differently
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Table 1 Summary of known results for the computation of an LFNE. The entries in boldface
correspond to original contributions of this work. The number of players is denoted by n.
Optimistic Pessimistic
Followers’ strategies Pure Mixed Pure Mixed
n “ 2 Complexity P P P P
Algorithm multi-LP multi-LP multi-LP multi-LP
n ě 3 Complexity P NP-hard, RPoly-APX NP-hard NP-hard, RPoly-APX
Algorithm multi-LP spatial branch-and-bound multi-lex-MILP -
n ě 4 Complexity P NP-hard, RPoly-APX NP-hard, RPoly-APX NP-hard, RPoly-APX
Algorithm multi-LP spatial branch-and-bound multi-lex-MILP -
from the optimistic case, in the pessimistic case the equilibrium-finding prob-
lem is NP-hard with two or more followers and not in Poly-APX when the
number of followers is three or more unless P “ NP. To establish these two
results, we introduce two reductions, one from Independent Set and the other
one from 3-SAT.
After analysing the complexity of the problem, we focus on its algorithmic
aspects. First, we formulate the problem as a pessimistic bilevel programming
problem with multiple followers. We, then, show how to recast it as a single-
level Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Program (QCQP), which we show
to be impractical to solve due to admitting a supremum, but not a max-
imum. We, then, introduce a restriction based on a Mixed-Integer Linear
Program (MILP) which, while forsaking optimality, always admits an opti-
mal (restricted) solution. Next, we propose an exact algorithm to compute
the value of the supremum of the problem, based on an enumeration scheme
which, at each iteration, solves a lexicographic MILP (lex-MILP) where the
two objective functions are optimised in sequence. Subsequently, we embed
the enumerative algorithm within a branch-and-bound scheme—obtaining an
algorithm which is, in practice, much faster. We also extend the algorithm (in
both versions) so that, for cases where the supremum is not a maximum, it
returns a strategy by which the leader can obtain a utility within an additive
loss α with respect to the supremum, for an arbitrarily chosen α ą 0. To con-
clude, we experimentally evaluate the scalability of our methods over a rich
testbed of instances which is standard in game theory.
The status, in terms of complexity and known algorithms, of the prob-
lem of computing an LFNE (with followers playing pure or mixed strategies)
is summarised in Table 1. The original results we provide in this paper are
reported in boldface.
Computing Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria: the Mixed-Pure Case 5
1.3 Paper Outline
The paper is organised as follows.1 Previous works are introduced in Section 2.
The problem we study is formally stated in Section 3, together with some
preliminary results. In Section 4, we present the computational complexity
results. Section 5 introduces the single-level reformulation(s) of the problem,
while Section 6 describes our exact algorithm (in its two versions). An empirical
evaluation of our methods is carried out in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 Previous Works
As we mentioned in Section 1, most of the works on (normal-form) LFGs focus
on the single-follower case. In such case, as shown in [9], the follower always
plays a pure strategy, except for degenerate games. In the optimistic case, an
LFE can be found in polynomial time by solving a Linear Program (LP) for
each action of the (single) follower (the algorithm is, thus, a multi-LP). Each
LP maximises the expected utility of the leader, subject to a set of constraints
imposing that the given follower’s action is a best-response [9]. As shown in [8],
all these LPs can be encoded into a single LP—a slight variation of the LP that
is used to compute a correlated equilibrium (the solution concept where all the
players can exploit a correlation device to coordinate their strategies).2 Some
works study the equilibrium-finding problem (only in the optimistic version)
in structured games where the action space is combinatorial. See [5] for more
references.
For what concerns the pessimistic single-follower case, the authors of [24]
study the problem of computing the supremum of the leader’s expected utility.
They show that, for the latter, it suffices to consider the follower’s actions
which constitute a best-response to a full-dimensional region of the leader’s
strategy space. The multi-LP algorithm the authors propose solves two LPs
per action of the follower, one to verify whether the best-response region for
that action is full-dimensional (so to discard it if full-dimensionality does not
hold) and a second one to compute the best leader’s strategy within that best-
response region. The algorithm runs in polynomial time. While the authors
limit their analysis to computing the supremum of the leader’s utility, we
remark that such value does not always translate into a strategy that the
leader can play as, in the general case where the leader’s utility does not
admit a maximum, there is no leader’s strategy giving her a utility equal to the
supremum. In such cases, one should rather look for a strategy providing the
leader with an expected utility which approximates the value of the supremum.
This aspect, which is not addressed in [24], will be tackled, on the multi-
follower case, by our work.
1 A preliminary version of this work appeared in [7].
2 In this case, the leader and the follower play correlated strategies under the rationality
constraints imposed on the follower only, maximising the leader’s expected utility.
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The multi-follower case, which, to the best of our knowledge, has only been
investigated in [3, 4], is computationally much harder than the single-follower
case, being, in the general case with the leader and the followers entitled to
mixed strategies, NP-hard and inapproximable, in polynomial time, to within
any polynomial factors unless P “ NP. In the aforementioned works, the prob-
lem of finding an equilibrium in the optimistic case is formulated as a nonlinear
and nonconvex mathematical program and solved to global optimality (within
a given tolerance) with spatial branch-and-bound techniques. No exact meth-
ods are proposed for the pessimistic case.
3 Problem Statement and Preliminary Results
After setting the notation used throughout the paper, this section offers a
formal definition of the equilibrium-finding problem we tackle in this work
and illustrates some of its properties.
3.1 Notation
Let N “ t1, . . . , nu be the set of players and, for each player p P N , let Ap
be her set of actions, of cardinality mp “ |Ap|. Let also A “ ŚpPN Ap “
A1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ An. For each player p P N , let xp P r0, 1smp , with řapPAp xapp “ 1,
be her strategy vector (or strategy, for short), where each component x
ap
p of
xp represents the probability by which player p plays action ap P Ap. For each
player p P N , let also ∆p “ txp P r0, 1smp : řapPAp xapp “ 1u be the set of
her strategies, or strategy space, which corresponds to the standard pmp ´ 1q-
simplex in Rmp . A strategy is said pure when only one action is played with
positive probability, i.e., when xp P t0, 1ump , and mixed otherwise. In the
following, we denote the collection of strategies of the different players, or
strategy profile, by x “ px1, . . . , xnq. For the case where all strategies are pure,
we denote the collection of actions played by the players, or action profile, by
a “ pa1, . . . , anq.
Given a strategy profile x, we denote the collection of all the strategies in
it but that one of player p P N by x´p, i.e., x´p “ px1, . . . , xp´1, xp`1, . . . , xnq.
Given x´p and a strategy vector xp, we denote the whole strategy profile x
by px´p, xpq. For action profiles, a´p and pa´p, apq are defined analogously.
For the case were all players are restricted to pure strategies, with the sole
exception of player p, who is allowed to play mixed strategies, we use the
notation pa´p, xpq.
We consider normal-form games where Up P Qm1ˆ...ˆmn represents, for
each player p P N , her (multidimensional) utility (or payoff) matrix, assuming,
without loss of generality, entries in r1, Umaxs and Umax ě 1. For each p P N
and given an action profile a “ pa1, . . . , anq, each component Ua1...anp of Up
corresponds to the utility of player p when all the players play the action
profile a. For the ease of presentation and when no ambiguity arises, we will
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often write, in the following, Uap in place of U
a1...an
p and, given a collection
of actions a´p and an action ap P Ap, we will also use Ua´p,app to denote
the component of Up corresponding to the action profile pa´p, apq. Given a
strategy profile x “ px1, . . . , xnq, the expected utility of player p P N is the
n-th-degree polynomial
ř
aPA Uap x
a1
1 x
a2
2 . . . x
an
n .
An action profile a “ pa1, . . . , anq is called pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
(or pure NE, for short) if, when the players in Nztpu play as the equilibrium
prescribes, player p cannot improve her utility by deviating from the equilib-
rium and playing another action a1p ‰ ap, for all p P N . More generally, a
mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (or mixed NE, for short) is a strategy profile
x “ px1, . . . , xnq such that no player p P N can improve her utility by playing
a strategy x1p ‰ xp, assuming the other players would play as the equilib-
rium prescribes. Observe that, in a normal-form game, a mixed NE always
exists [16], while a pure NE may not. For more details on (noncooperative)
game theory, we refer the reader to [22].
Similar definitions hold for the case of LFGs when assuming that only a
subset of players (the followers) play an NE, given the strategy the leader has
committed to.
3.2 The Problem and Its Formulation
In the following, we assume that the n-th player takes the role of leader. We
denote the set of followers (the first n ´ 1 players) by F “ Nztnu. For the
ease of notation, we also define AF “ŚpPF Ap as the set of followers’ action
profiles, i.e., the set of all collections of followers’ actions. We also assume,
unless otherwise stated, mp “ m for every player p P N , where m denotes the
number of actions available to each player. This is without loss of generality,
as one can always introduce additional actions with a utility small enough to
guarantee that they would never be played, so to obtain a game where each
player has the same number of actions.
As we mentioned in Section 1, we tackle, in this work, the problem of
computing an equilibrium in a normal-form game where the followers play a
pure NE once observed the leader’s commitment to a mixed strategy. We refer
to an Optimistic Leader-Follower Pure Nash Equilibrium (O-LFPNE) when
the followers play a pure NE which maximises the leader’s utility, and to a
Pessimistic Leader-Follower Pure Nash Equilibrium (P-LFPNE) when they
seek a pure NE by which the leader’s utility is minimised.
3.2.1 The Optimistic Case
Before focusing our attention entirely on the pessimistic case, let us briefly
address the optimistic one.
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An O-LFPNE can be found by solving the following bilevel programming
problem with n´ 1 followers:
max
xn,x´n
ÿ
aPA
Uanx
a1
1 x
a2
2 . . . x
an
n
s.t. xn P ∆n
xp P argmax
xp
ÿ
aPA
Uap x
a1
1 x
a2
2 . . . x
an
n @p P F
s.t. xp P ∆p X t0, 1ump .
(1)
Note that, due to the integrality constraints on xp for all p P F , each fol-
lower can play a single action with probability 1. By imposing the argmax
constraint for each p P F , the formulation guarantees that each follower
plays a best-response action ap, thus guaranteeing that the action profile
a´n “ pa1, . . . , an´1q with, for all ap P Ap, ap “ 1 if and only if xapp “ 1,
be an NE for the given xn. It is crucial to note that the maximisation in the
upper level is carried out not only w.r.t. xn, but also w.r.t. x´n. This way,
if, for the chosen xn, the followers’ game admits multiple NEs, optimal solu-
tions to Problem (1) are guaranteed to contain followers’ action profiles which
maximise the leader’s utility—thus satisfying the assumption of optimism.
As easily shown in the following proposition, computing an O-LFPNE is
an easy task:
Proposition 1 In a normal-form game, an O-LFPNE can be computed in
polynomial time by solving a multi-LP.
Proof It suffices to enumerate, in Opmn´1q, all the followers’ action profiles
a´n P AF and, for each of them, solve an LP to i. check whether there is a
strategy vector xn for the leader for which the action profile a´n is an NE and
ii. find, among all such strategy vectors xn, one which maximises the leader’s
utility. The action profile a´n which, with the corresponding xn, yields the
largest expected utility for the leader is an O-LFPNE.
Given a followers’ action profile a´n, i and ii can be carried out in polyno-
mial time by solving the following LP, where the second constraint guarantees
that, for any of its solutions xn, a´n “ pa1, . . . , an´1q is a pure NE for the
followers’ game:
max
xn
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,ann x
an
n
s.t.
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,anp x
an
n ě
ÿ
anPAn
U
a1...a
1
p...an´1an
p x
an
n @p P F, a1p P Apztapu
xn P ∆n.
Note that, assuming utilities in r1, Umaxs and a binary encoding, the size of
an instance of the problem is OpmnrlogUmaxsq and, thus, the followers’ action
profiles can be enumerated in polynomial time. The claim of polynomiality
of the overall algorithm follows due to linear programming problems being
solvable in polynomial time. [\
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3.2.2 The Pessimistic Case
In the pessimistic case, the computation of a P-LFPNE amounts to solving
the following pessimistic bilevel problem with n´ 1 followers:
sup
xn
min
x´n
ÿ
aPA
Uanx
a1
1 x
a2
2 . . . x
an
n
s.t. xn P ∆n
xp P argmax
xp
ÿ
aPA
Uap x
a1
1 x
a2
2 . . . x
an
n @p P F
s.t. xp P ∆p X t0, 1ump .
(2)
There are two differences between this problem and its optimistic counterpart:
the presence of the min operator in the objective function and the fact that,
rather than for a max, Problem (2) calls for a sup. The former guarantees
that, in the presence of more pure NEs in the followers’ game for the chosen
xn, one which minimises the leader’s utility is selected. The sup operator is
introduced dbecause, as illustrated in Subsection 3.3, the pessimistic problem
does not admit, in the general case, a maximum.
Throughout the paper, we will compactly refer to the above problem as
sup
xnP∆n
fpxnq,
where f is the leader’s utility in the pessimistic case, defined as a function
of xn. Since a pure NE may not exist for every leader’s strategy xn, we define
supxnP∆n fpxnq “ ´8 whenever there is no xn such that the resulting follow-
ers’ game admits a pure NE. Note that f is always bounded from above when
assuming bounded payoffs and, thus, supxnP∆n fpxnq ă 8.
3.3 Some Preliminary Results
As it is clear, since not all normal-form games admit a pure NE, a normal-
form game may not admit an LFPNE. Nevertheless, assuming that the payoffs
of the game are independent and follow a uniform distribution, a leader’s
commitment such that the resulting followers’ game has at least one pure NE
exists with high probability, provided that the number of players’ actions is
sufficiently large. This is shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Given a normal-form game with n players with independent
and uniformly distributed payoffs, the probability that there exists a leader’s
strategy xn P ∆n inducing at least one pure NE in the followers’ game ap-
proaches 1 as the number of players’ actions m goes to infinity.
Proof In a normal-form game with independent and uniformly distributed
payoffs with n players, as shown in [23], the probability of the existence of at
least one pure NE can be expressed as a function of the number of players’
actions m, say Ppmq, which approaches 1´ 1e for mÑ8. Suppose now that we
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are given one such n-player normal-form game. Then, for every leader’s action
an P An, let Panpmq be the probability that the followers’ game induced by the
leader’s action an admits at least a pure NE. Since each of the followers’ games
resulting from the choice of an also has independent and uniformly distributed
payoffs, all the probabilities are equal, i.e., Panpmq “ Ppmq for every an P An.
It follows that the probability that at least one of such followers’ games admits
a pure NE is:
1´
ź
anPAn
p1´ Panpmqq “ 1´ p1´ Ppmqqm .
Since, as m goes to infinity, this probability approaches 1, the probability of
the existence of a leader’s strategy xn P ∆n which induces at least one pure
NE in the followers’ game also approaches 1 for mÑ8. [\
The fact that Problem (2) may not admit a maximum is shown by the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 In a normal-form game, Problem (2) may not admit a max
even if the followers’ game admits a pure NE for any leader’s mixed strat-
egy xn.
Proof Consider a game with n “ 3, A1 “ ta11, a21u, A2 “ ta12, a22u, A3 “
ta13, a23u. The matrices reported in the following are the utility matrices for,
respectively, the case where the leader plays action a13 with probability 1,
action a23 with probability 1, or the strategy vector x3 “ p1 ´ ρ, ρq for some
ρ P r0, 1s (the third matrix is the convex combination of the first two with
weights x3):
a12 a
2
2
a11 1,1,0 2,2,5
a21
1
2 ,
1
2 ,1 1,1,0
a13
a12 a
2
2
a11 0,0,0 2,2,10
a21
1
2 ,
1
2 ,1 0,0,0
a23
a12 a
2
2
a11 1´ ρ,1´ ρ,0 2,2,5` 5ρ
a21
1
2 ,
1
2 ,1 1´ ρ,1´ ρ,0
x3 “ p1´ ρ, ρq
In the optimistic case, as it is easy to verify, pa11, a22, a23q is the unique O-
LFPNE (as it achieves the largest leader’s payoff in U3, a mixed strategy x3
would not yield a better utility).
In the pessimistic case, by playing x3 “ p1 ´ ρ, ρq, the leader induces the
followers’ game in the third matrix. For ρ ă 12 , pa11, a22q is the unique NE,
giving the leader a utility of 5`5ρ. For ρ ě 12 , there are two NEs, pa11, a22q andpa21, a12q, with a utility of, respectively, 5` 5ρ and 1. Since, in the pessimistic
case, the latter is selected, we conclude that the leader’s utility is equal to
5 ` 5ρ for ρ ă 12 and to 1 for ρ ě 12 (see Figure 1 for an illustration). Thus,
Problem (2) admits a supremum of value 5` 52 , but not a maximum. [\
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1
2
1
5
5` 52
ρ
fpx3q
Fig. 1 The leader’s utility in the normal-form game in the proof of Proposition 3, showing
that Problem (2) may not admit a maximum.
We remark that the result in Proposition 3 is in line with a similar result
shown in [24] for the single-follower case, as well as those which hold for more
general pessimistic bilevel problems [25].
The relevance of computing a pessimistic LFPNE is highlighted by the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 In normal-form games, the leader’s utility in a P-LFPNE can
be arbitrarily worse than that in an O-LFPNE. Moreover, the utility that is ob-
tained after perturbing the leader’s strategy in an O-LFPNE can be arbitrarily
worse than that one in a P-LFPNE.
Proof Consider the following normal-form game, with n “ 3, A1 “ ta11, a21u,
A2 “ ta12, a22u, A3 “ ta13, a23u, parameterised by µ ą 1:
a12 a
2
2
a11 1,1,0
1
2 ,
1
2 ,0
a21 2,2,1 0,0,0
a13
a12 a
2
2
a11 0,0,0
1
2 ,
1
2 ,4µ
a21 2,2,µ 1,1,0
a23
a12 a
2
2
a11 1´ ρ,1´ ρ,0
1
2 ,
1
2 ,4µρ
a21 2,2,1` ρpµ´ 1q ρ,ρ,0
x3 “ p1´ ρ, ρq
Let x3 “ p1 ´ ρ, ρq. The followers’ game admits the NE pa21, a12q for all
values of ρ (with leader’s utility 1`ρpµ´1q), as well as a second one, pa11, a22q,
for ρ “ 12 (with leader’s utility 2µ). Therefore, the game admits a unique O-
LFPNE, achieved at ρ “ 12 (utility 2µ), and a unique P-LFPNE, achieved at
ρ “ 1 (utility µ). See Figure 2 for an illustration of the leader’s utility function.
To show the first part of the claim, it suffices to observe that, by letting
µ Ñ 8, the difference in utility between O-LFPNE and P-LFPNE, equal to
µ, becomes arbitrarily large.
As to the second part of the claim, note that after perturbing the value
that x3 takes in the unique O-LFPNE by any  P r´ 12 , 12 s with  ‰ 0 we obtain
a leader’s utility of p1`µq{2`pµ´ 1q, whose difference w.r.t. the utility of µ
in the unique P-LFPNE is again arbitrarily large for µÑ8. [\
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1
2
1
1
1` µ
2
µ
2µ
ρ
fpx3q
Fig. 2 The leader’s utility in the normal-form game in the proof of Proposition 4, plotted
as a function of ρ, where the leader’s strategy is x3 “ p1´ ρ, ρq.
4 Computational Complexity
Let P-LFPNE-s be the search version of the problem of computing a P-LFPNE.
In this section, we study the computational complexity of solving P-LFPNE-s
for normal-form games. In particular, we show, in Subsection 4.1, that P-
LFPNE-s is NP-hard for n ě 3 (i.e., with at least two followers), and, in
Subsection 4.2, that P-LFPNE-s is not in Poly-APX for n ě 4 (i.e., for games
with at least three followers), unless P = NP. We introduce two reductions, a
non approximation-preserving one which is valid for n ě 3 and another one,
only valid for n ě 4, but approximation-preserving.
In decision form, the problem of computing a P-LFPNE reads:
Definition 1 (P-LFPNE-d) Given a normal-form game with n ě 3 players
and a finite number K, is there a P-LFPNE where the leader achieves a utility
greater than or equal to K?
We show, in Section 4.1, that P-LFPNE-d is NP-complete via a polynomial-
time reduction of Independent Set (IND-SET), one of Karp’s original 21 NP-
complete problems [10], to it. In decision form, IND-SET reads:
Definition 2 (IND-SET-d) Given an undirected graph G “ pV,Eq and
an integer J ď |V |, does G contain an independent set (a subset of vertices
V 1 Ď V : @u, v P V 1, tu, vu R E) of size greater than or equal to J?
We prove, in Subsection 4.2, the inapproximability of P-LFPNE-s for the
case with at least three followers via a polynomial-time reduction of 3-SAT,
another of Karp’s 21 NP-complete problems [10], to P-LFPNE-d. 3-SAT reads:
Definition 3 (3-SAT) Given a collection C “ tφ1, . . . , φtu of clauses (dis-
junctions of literals) on a finite set V of boolean variables with |φc| “ 3 for
1 ď c ď t, is there a truth assignment for V which satisfies all the clauses in
C?
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4.1 NP-Completeness
Before presenting our reduction, we introduce the following class of normal-
form games:
Definition 4 Given two rational numbers b and c, with 1 ą c ą b ą 0,
and an integer r ě 1, let Γ cb prq be a class of normal-form games with three
players (n “ 3), the first two having r ` 1 actions each, with action sets
A1 “ A2 “ A “ t1, ..., r, χu, the third one having r actions, with action set
A3 “ Aztχu, and such that, for every third player’s action a3 P Aztχu, the
other players play a game where:
– the payoffs on the main diagonal (where both players play the same action)
satisfy Ua3a3a31 “ Ua3a3a32 “ 1, Uχχa31 “ c, Uχχa32 “ b and, for any a1 P
Azta3, χu, Ua1a1a31 “Ua1a1a32 “0;
– for every a1, a2 P Aztχu with a1 ‰ a2, Ua1a2a31 “Ua1a2a32 “ b;
– for every a2 P Aztχu, Uχa2a31 “c and Uχa2a32 “0;
– for every a1 P Aztχu, Ua1χa31 “1 and Ua1χa32 “0.
No restrictions are imposed on the third player’s payoffs.
1 2 3 χ
1 1, 1, 0 b, b, 0 b, b, 0 1, 0, 0
2 b, b, 0 0, 0, 1 b, b, 0 1, 0, 0
3 b, b, 0 b, b, 0 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0
χ c, 0, 0 c, 0, 0 c, 0, 0 c, b, 0
1
1 2 3 χ
1 0, 0, 1 b, b, 0 b, b, 0 1, 0, 0
2 b, b, 0 1, 1, 0 b, b, 0 1, 0, 0
3 b, b, 0 b, b, 0 0, 0,´ 1
c
´ 1 1, 0, 0
χ c, 0, 0 c, 0, 0 c, 0, 0 c, b, 0
2
1 2 3 χ
1 0, 0, 1 b, b, 0 b, b, 0 1, 0, 0
2 b, b, 0 0, 0,´ 1
c
´ 1 b, b, 0 1, 0, 0
3 b, b, 0 b, b, 0 1, 1, 0 1, 0, 0
χ c, 0, 0 c, 0, 0 c, 0, 0 c, b, 0
3
Fig. 3 A Γ cb prq game with r “ 3. The third player (the leader) selects a matrix, while the
first and the second players (the followers) select rows and columns, respectively. The third
player’s payoffs are defined starting from the graph in Figure 5, as explained in the proof of
Theorem 1.
The special feature of Γ cb prq games, see Figure 3 for an illustration of one
such game with r “ 3, parametric in b and c, is that, no matter which mixed
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strategy the third player (the leader) commits to, only diagonal outcomes,
with the exception of pχ, χq, can be pure NEs in the resulting followers’ game.
Moreover, for every subset of diagonal outcomes, there is a leader’s strategy
such that this subset precisely corresponds to the set of all pure NEs in the
followers’ game, as formally stated by the following proposition:
Proposition 5 A Γ cb prq game with c ď 1m for all S Ď tpa1, a1q : a1 P Aztχuu
with S ‰ H admits a leader’s strategy x3 P ∆3 such that the outcomes
pa1, a1q P S are the only pure NEs in the resulting followers’ game.
Proof First, observe that the followers’ payoffs that are not on the main diag-
onal are independent of the leader’s strategy x3. Thus, outcomes pa1, a2q, for
any a1, a2 P Aztχu with a1 ‰ a2, cannot be NEs, as the first follower would
deviate by playing action χ so to obtain a utility c ą b. Analogously, any
outcome pχ, a2q, with a2 P Aztχu, cannot be NE because the second follower
would deviate by playing χ (since b ą 0). The same holds for outcomes pa1, χq
with a1 P Aztχu, since the second follower would be better off playing another
action (as b ą 0). The last outcome on the diagonal, pχ, χq, cannot be an NE
either, as the first follower would deviate from it (as she would get c in it,
while she can obtain 1 ą c by deviating).
As a result, the only outcomes which can be pure NEs are those in tpa1, a1q :
a1 P Aztχuu. Clearly, when the leader plays a pure strategy a3, the unique
pure NE in the followers’ game is pa3, a3q as, due to providing the followers
with their maximum payoff, they would not deviate from it. Outcomes pa1, a1q
with a1 P Aztχ, a3u are not NEs as, with them, the first follower would get
0 ă c. In general, if the leader plays an arbitrary mixed strategy x3 P ∆3, the
resulting followers’ game is such that the payoffs in pa3, a3q, with a3 P Aztχu,
are pxa33 , xa33 q. Noticing that pa3, a3q is an equilibrium if and only if xa33 ě c (as,
otherwise, the first follower would deviate by playing action χ), we conclude
that the set of pure NEs in the followers’ game is S “ tpa3, a3q : xa33 ě cu.
In order to guarantee that, for every possible S Ď tpa1, a1q : a1 P Aztχuu
with S ‰ H, there is a leader’s strategy such that S contains all the pure
NEs of the followers’ game, we must allow the diagonal outcomes to be all
(simultaneously) equilibria by properly choosing the value of c. This is done
by imposing that, when the leader plays x3 “ p 1r , 1r , ..., 1r q, all outcomes intpa1, a1q : a1 P Aztχuu are NEs, which is obtained by selecting c ď 1r . [\
Notice that, in a Γ cb prq game with c ď 1r , the followers’ game always admits
a pure NE for any leader’s commitment x3. Graphically, as shown in Figure 4
for r “ 3, the leader’s strategy space, ∆3, is partitioned into 2r ´ 1 regions,
each corresponding to a subset of tpa1, a1q : a1 P Aztχuu containing those
diagonal outcomes which are the only NEs in the followers’ game. Hence, in a
Γ cb prq game with c ď 1r , the number of combinations of outcomes which may
constitute the set of NEs in the followers’ game is exponential in r, and, thus,
in the size of the game instance.
Relying on Proposition 5, we can establish the following result:
Theorem 1 P-LFPNE-d is strongly NP-complete even for n “ 3.
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A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
CC
C
C
Fig. 4 A Γ cb prq game with r “ 3 and c ď 1r . The leader’s strategy space ∆3 is partitioned
into 2r´ 1 regions, one per subset of tpa1, a1q : a1 P Aztχuu (the three NEs in the followers’
game, p1, 1q, p2, 2q, and p3, 3q, are labelled A, B, C).
Proof For the sake of clarity, we split the proof in some steps.
Mapping. Given an instance of IND-SET, i.e., an undirected graph G “
pV,Eq and a positive integer J , we construct Γ pGq, a special instance of P-
LFPNE-d of class Γ cb prq, as follows. Assuming an arbitrary labeling of the
vertices tv1, v2, ..., vru, let Γ pGq be an instance of Γ cb prq with c ă 1pr`1q2 ă 1r
and 0 ă b ă c ă 1, where each action a1 P Aztχu is associated with a vertex
va1 P V . In compliance with Definition 4, in which no constraints are specified
for the leader payoffs, we define:
– for any pair of vertices va1 , va2 P V : Ua1a1a23 “ Ua2a2a13 “ ´ 1c ´ 1 iftva1 , va2u P E, and Ua1a1a23 “ Ua2a2a13 “ 1 otherwise;
– for every a3 P Aztχu: Ua3a3a33 “ 0 and Uχχa33 “ 0;
– for every a3 P Aztχu and for every a1, a2 P A with a1 ‰ a2: Ua1a2a33 “
Ua2a1a33 “ 0.
As an example, Figure 5 illustrates an instance of IND-SET from which the
game depicted in Figure 3 is obtained by reduction. Finally, let K “ J´1J . Note
that, as it is clear, this transformation can be carried out in time polynomial
in the number of vertices |V | “ r.
v1
v2 v3
Fig. 5 An undirected graph G “ pV,Eq, where V “ tv1, v2, v3u and E “ ttv2, v3uu.
If. We show that, if the graph G contains an independent set of size greater
than or equal to J , then Γ pGq admits a P-LFPNE with leader’s utility greater
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than or equal to K. Let V ˚ be an independent set with |V ˚| “ J . Consider
the case in which outcomes pa1, a1q, with va1 P V ˚, are the only pure NEs in
the followers’ game, and suppose that the leader’s strategy x3 is x
a3
3 “ 1|V ˚| if
va3 P V ˚ and xa33 “ 0 otherwise. Since, by construction, Ua1a1a33 “ 1 for all
a3 P Aztχ, a1u, the leader’s utility at an equilibrium pa1, a1q is:ÿ
a3PAztχu
Ua1a1a33 x
a3
3 “
ÿ
a3PAztχ,a1u
Ua1a1a33 x
a3
3 “
ÿ
a3PAztχ,a1u
xa33 “
|V ˚| ´ 1
|V ˚| “ K.
Only if. We show that, if Γ pGq admits a P-LFPNE with leader’s utility
greater than or equal to K, then G contains an independent set of size greater
than or equal to J . Due to Proposition 5, at any P-LFPNE the leader plays a
strategy x¯3 inducing a set of pure NEs in the followers’ game corresponding to
S˚ “ tpa3, a3q : x¯a33 ě cu. We now show that, in a P-LFPNE, the leader would
never play two actions a1, a2 P Aztχu, with tva1 , va2u P E, with probability
greater than or equal to c. By contradiction, suppose the leader’s equilibrium
strategy x¯3 is such that x¯
a1
3 , x¯
a2
3 ě c. When the followers play the equilibriumpa1, a1q (the same holds for pa2, a2q), the leader’s utility is:ÿ
a3PAztχu
Ua1a1a33 x¯
a3
3 “
ÿ
a3PAztχ,a1,a2u
Ua1a1a33 x¯
a3
3 ` x¯a23 p´
1
c
´ 1q.
In the right-hand side, the first term is ă 1 (as the leader’s payoffs are ď 1 andř
a3PAztχ,a1,a2u x¯
a3
3 “ 1´ x¯a13 ´ x¯a23 ă 1, since x¯a13 , x¯a23 ě c). The second term is
less than or equal to cp´ 1c´1q “ ´1´c (as x¯a23 ě c), which is strictly less than´1. It follows that, since pa1, a1q (or, equivalently, pa2, a2q) always provides
the leader with a negative utility, she would never play x¯3 in an equilibrium.
This is because, by playing a pure strategy, she would obtain a utility of at
least zero (as, when she plays a pure strategy, the followers’ game admits a
unique pure NE giving her a zero payoff). As a result, for any action a3 such
that x¯a33 ě c, we have Ua3a3a33 “ 0, and Ua1a1a33 “ 1 for every a1 such that
x¯a13 ě c (since va1 and va3 are not connected by an edge).
Now, let us make the following assumption.
Assumption: the leader either plays an action with probability greater than
or equal to c or she does not play it at all.
If this is the case, then the leader’s utility at an equilibrium pa3, a3q P S˚
is 1´ x¯a33 . Since, due to the pessimistic assumption, the leader maximises her
utility in the worst NE, her best choice is to select an x¯3 such that all NEs yield
the same utility, that is: x¯a13 “ x¯a23 for every a1, a2 with pa1, a1q, pa2, a2q P S˚.
This results in the leader playing all actions a3 such that pa3, a3q P S˚ with
the same probability x¯a33 “ 1|S˚| , obtaining a utility of |S
˚|´1
|S˚| “ K. Therefore,
the vertices in the set tva3 : pa3, a3q P S˚u form an independent set of G of
size |S˚| “ J .
We now show that, if c ă 4pr`1q2 , the previous assumption always holds,
i.e., in any P-LFPNE, the leader is not better off playing any action with
probability less than c. Observe that, without imposing any constraint on
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c, except for c ď 1r , the aforementioned assumption may not hold true in
presence of isolated vertices. Indeed, suppose that va1 is the only isolated
vertex in G and r ě 3. Then, as we show next, there is a P-LFPNE in which
the leader plays a strategy x3 such that, for every a3 P Azta1, χu, xa33 “ c1,
where c1 “ c ´  for some  ą 0, while xa13 “ 1 ´ c1pr ´ 1q. Since the latter
probability is greater than c by definition (as it is always greater than or equal
to 1r ), the unique NE for the followers is pa1, a1q, providing the leader with
a utility of 1 ´ xa13 “ c1pr ´ 1q, which approaches r´1r for c1 Ñ 1r . Assuming
c “ 1r , for c1 Ñ 1r the strategy x3 is part of a P-LFPNE, since, as previously
shown, the leader cannot get more than r´2r´1 without playing actions with
probability smaller than c. For instance, consider the game in Figure 3 that is
obtained from the graph G in Figure 5. As one can see, v1 is the only isolated
vertex in G, and, as a consequence, the strategy x3 such that x
1
3 “ 1´ 2c1 and
x23 “ x33 “ c1 is part of a P-LFPNE, for c1 Ñ 13 .
In general, let us denote by ` the number of isolated vertices in G, and
assume that the other r ´ ` ě 2 vertices form a complete graph. This corre-
sponds to the worst case as, for it, the leader cannot get a utility larger than
`
``1 without playing some actions with probability smaller than c, but, at the
same time, she could get more by uniformly playing the ` actions associated
with the isolated vertices, each with probability α “ 1´pr´`qc1` , while playing
with probability c1 the other r´` actions. If this is the case, the leader’s utility
is:
p`´ 1qα` pr ´ `q c1 “ p`´ 1q ` pr ´ `qc
1
`
.
Thus, in order for the assumption to hold true, we require p`´1q`pr´`qc
1
` ă ```1
for every ` P t1, ..., r ´ 2u, which implies that c must satisfy:
p`` 1qp`´ 1q ` p`` 1qpr ´ `qc ă `2,
in which we upper bounded c1 by c. The above condition is satisfied, in turn,
if and only if:
c ă 1p`` 1qpr ´ `q .
We deduce that c satisfies the condition for all ` whenever c ď 4pr`1q2 . The
latter is the minimum value taken by 1p``1qpr´`q , achieved at ` “ r´12 , where
p``1q´pr´`q
p``1q2pr´`q2 , the derivative of
1
p``1qpr´`q , which is a strictly convex function of
`, vanishes. Given that, according to our definition, c ă 1pr`1q2 ă 4pr`1q2 , we
obtain that the condition is always satisfied, implying that the leader either
plays an action with probability at least c or she never plays such action. The
reduction, thus, is complete.
NP membership. Since, given a triple pa1, a2, x3q, we can verify in poly-
nomial time whether pa1, a2q is an NE in the followers’ game induced by x3
and whether, when playing pa1, a2, x3q, the leader’s utility is at least K, we
deduce that P-LFPNE-d belongs to NP. Thus, the problem is strongly NP-
complete due to IND-SET being strongly NP-complete. [\
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4.2 Inapproximability
We show now that the problem of computing a P-LFNE is not only NP-
hard, but it is also difficult to approximate even in the case of only three
followers. Since the reduction from IND-SET which we gave in Theorem 1
is not approximation-preserving, we propose a new one based on 3-SAT (see
Definition 3).
In the following, given a literal l (an occurrence of a variable, possibly
negated), we define vplq as its corresponding variable. Moreover, for a generic
clause
φ “ l1 _ l2 _ l3,
we denote the ordered set of possible truth assignments to the variables,
namely, x “ vpl1q, y “ vpl2q, and z “ vpl3q, by
Lφ “ txyz, xyz¯, xy¯z, xy¯z¯, x¯yz, x¯yz¯, x¯y¯z, x¯y¯z¯u,
where, in each truth assignment, a variable is set to 1 if positive and to 0 if
negative. Given a generic 3-SAT instance, we build a corresponding normal-
form game as detailed in the following definition.
Definition 5 Given a 3-SAT instance where C “ tφ1, . . . , φtu is a collection
of clauses and V “ tv1, . . . , vru is a set of Boolean variables, let Γ pC, V q
be a normal-form game with four players (n “ 4) defined as follows. The
fourth player has an action for each variable in V plus an additional one,
i.e., A4 “ t1, . . . , ru Y twu, where each action a1 P t1, . . . , ru is associated
with variable va1 . The other players share the same set of actions A, with
A “ A1 “ A2 “ A3 “ tϕca | c P t1, . . . , tu, a P t1, . . . , 8uu Y tχu, where each
action ϕca is associated with one of the eight possible assignments of truth
to the variables appearing in clause φc, so that ϕca corresponds to the a-th
assignment in the ordered set Lφc . For each player p P t1, 2, 3u, we define her
utilities as follows:
– for each a4 P A4ztwu and for each a1 P Aztχu with a1 “ ϕca “ l1l2l3,
Ua1a1a1a4p “ 1 if vplpq “ va4 and lp is a positive literal or vplpq ‰ va4 and
lp is negative;
– for each a4 P A4ztwu and for each a1 P Aztχu with a1 “ ϕca “ l1l2l3,
Ua1a1a1a4p “ 0 if vplpq “ va4 and lp is a negative literal or vplpq ‰ va4 and
lp is positive;
– for each a1 P Aztχu with a1 “ ϕca “ l1l2l3, Ua1a1a1wp “ 0 if lp is a positive
literal, while Ua1a1a1wp “ 1 otherwise;
– for each a4 P A4, for each a1, a2, a3 P Aztχu with ‰ pa1, a2, a3q, Ua1a2a3a4p “
1
r`2 ;
– for each a4 P A4, a3 P Aztχu, and a2 P Aztχu with a2 “ ϕca “ l1l2l3,
Uχa2a3a41 “ 1r`1 if l1 is a positive literal, whereas Uχa2a3a41 “ rr`1 if l1 is
negative, while Uχa2a3a42 “ Uχa2a3a43 “ 0;
– for each a4 P A4, a3 P Aztχu, and a1 P Aztχu with a1 “ ϕca “ l1l2l3,
Ua1χa3a42 “ 1r`1 if l2 is a positive literal, whereas Ua1χa3a42 “ rr`1 if l2 is
negative, while Ua1χa3a41 “ 1 and Ua1χa3a43 “ 0;
Computing Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria: the Mixed-Pure Case 19
– for each a4 P A4, a1 P Aztχu, and a2 P Aztχu with a2 “ ϕca “ l1l2l3,
Ua1a2χa43 “ 1r`1 if l3 is a positive literal, whereas Ua1a2χa43 “ rr`1 if l3 is
negative, while Ua1a2χa41 “ 0 and Ua1a2χa42 “ 1;
– for each a4 P A4, Ua1χχa41 “ Ua1χχa43 “ 1 and Ua1χχa42 “ 0, for all a1 P
Aztχu;
– for each a4 P A4, Uχa2χa41 “ 1 and Uχa2χa42 “ Uχa2χa43 “ 0, for all a2 P
Aztχu;
– for each a4 P A4, Uχχa3a41 “ Uχχa3a43 “ 0 and Uχχa3a42 “ 1, for all a3 P A.
The payoff matrix of the fourth player is so defined:
– for each a4 P A4 and for each a1 P Aztχu with a1 “ ϕca “ l1l2l3,
Ua1a1a1a44 “  if the truth assignment identified by ϕca makes φc false
(i.e., whenever, for each p P t1, 2, 3u, the clause φc contains the negation
of lp), while U
a1a1a1a4
4 “ 1 otherwise, where  ą 0;
– for each a4 P A4 and for each a1, a2, a3 P A with ‰ pa1, a2, a3q, with the
addition of the triple pχ, χ, χq, Ua1a2a3a44 “ 0.
Games adhering to Definition 5 have some useful properties, which we
formally state in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Given a game Γ pC, V q and an action a1 P Aztχu, with a1 “
ϕca “ l1l2l3, the outcome pa1, a1, a1q is an NE of the followers’ game whenever
the leader commits to a strategy x4 P ∆4 such that:
– xa44 ě 1r`1 if vplpq “ va4 and lp is a positive literal, for some p P t1, 2, 3u;
– xa44 ď 1r`1 if vplpq “ va4 and lp is a negative literal, for some p P t1, 2, 3u;
– xa44 can be any if vplpq ‰ va4 for each p P t1, 2, 3u.
All the other outcomes of the followers’ game cannot be NEs, for any of the
leader’s commitments.
Proof Observe that, in the outcomes not in tpa1, a1, a1q : a1 P Aztχuu, the
followers’ payoffs do not depend on the leader’s strategy x4. Thus, outcomes
pa1, a2, a3q, for every a1, a2, a3 P Aztχu with ‰ pa1, a2, a3q, cannot be NEs, as
the first follower would deviate by playing action χ, obtaining a utility at least
of 1r`1 , instead of
1
r`2 . Also, outcomes pχ, a2, a3q, for all a2, a3 P Aztχu, are
not NEs, since the second follower is better off playing χ (as she gets 1 ą 0).
Analogously, outcomes pa1, χ, a3q cannot be NEs, for all a1, a3 P Aztχu, as the
third follower would deviate to χ (providing her with a utility of 1 ą 0). A
similar argument also applies to outcomes pχ, χ, a3q, for all a3 P A, as the first
follower has an incentive to deviate by playing any action different from χ.
Moreover, outcomes pa1, χ, χq are not NEs, for all a1 P Aztχu, as the second
follower would deviate to any other action (providing her with a utility of 1).
The same holds for outcomes pa1, a2, χq, for all a1, a2 P Aztχu, where the first
follower would deviate and play action χ, and for outcomes pχ, a2, χq, for all
a2 P ztχu, where the second follower would deviate and play χ.
Therefore, the only outcomes which can be NEs in the followers’ game
are those in tpa1, a1, a1q : a1 P Aztχuu. Suppose the leader commits to an
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arbitrary mixed strategy x4 P ∆4. The outcome pa1, a1, a1q, for a1 P Aztχu
with a1 “ ϕca “ l1l2l3, provides follower p, for any p P t1, 2, 3u, with a utility
of up, such that:
– up “ xa44 if vplpq “ va4 and lp is a positive literal;
– up “ 1´ xa44 if vplpq “ va4 and lp is a negative literal;
Clearly, pa1, a1, a1q is an NE if the following conditions hold:
– up ě 1r`1 for each p P t1, 2, 3u such that lp is positive, as otherwise follower
p would deviate and play χ;
– up ě rr`1 for each p P t1, 2, 3u such that lp is negative, as otherwise follower
p would deviate and play χ;
The claim is proven by these conditions, together with the definition of up. [\
The property stated in Proposition 6 has an interesting interpretation if we
look at the strategy space of the leader. In particular, given a game Γ pC, V q,
the leader’s strategy space ∆4 is partitioned according to the boundaries
xa44 “ 1r`1 , for a4 P A4ztwu, by which ∆4 is split into 2r regions, each corre-
sponding to a possible truth assignment to the variables in V . Specifically, in
the assignment corresponding to some region, variable va4 takes values TRUE
if xa44 ě 1r`1 , while it takes value FALSE if xa44 ď 1r`1 . Moreover, an outcomepa1, a1, a1q, for a1 P Aztχu and a1 “ ϕca, is an NE of the followers’ game
only in the regions of the leader’s strategy space whose corresponding truth
assignment is compatible with the one represented by ϕca. For instance, if
ϕca “ v¯1v2v3, the corresponding outcome is an NE only if x14 ď 1r`1 , x24 ě 1r`1
and x34 ě 1r`1 (with no further restrictions on the other probabilities).
In order to better understand how these games are built, let us make a
simplified example, using 2-SAT instead of 3-SAT. Given an instance of 2-SAT
(a restriction of 3-SAT in which each clause can only contain two literals), we
build Γ pC, V q as in Definition 5, using only two followers instead of three.
Consider, as an example, the instance of 2-SAT and its corresponding game
in Figure 6. As one can easily see, the only outcomes which can be NEs in
the followers’ game are those where both followers play the same action, with
the exception of pχ, χq.3 For instance, let us consider outcome pv1v¯2, v1v¯2q.
Given the leader’s strategy x4 P ∆4, the followers’ payoffs in such outcome are
px14, 1 ´ x24q, and, therefore, both followers have no incentive to deviate from
pv1v¯2, v1v¯2q (that is, to play action χ) only when x14 ě 13 and x24 ď 13 , which
are the constraints identifying those regions of ∆4 that correspond to truth
assignments compatible with v1v¯2.
We are now ready to state the result.
Theorem 2 Computing a P-LFPNE is not in Poly-APX even for n “ 4,
unless P = NP.
3 In this simple example, outcomes pa1, χq, for all a1 P Aztχu, are always NEs in the
followers’ game. They can nevertheless be ignored since, if we considered 3-SAT, they would
not be NEs as the third follower would have incentive to deviate by playing action χ.
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v1v2 v1v¯2 v¯1v2 v¯1v¯2 χ
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4
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4
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4
, 1
4
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3
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1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
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3
, 0
χ 1
3
, 0, 0 1
3
, 0, 0 2
3
, 0, 0 2
3
, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
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v1v2 v1v¯2 v¯1v2 v¯1v¯2 χ
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1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1, 1
3
, 0
v1v¯2
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4
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4
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, 1
4
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4
, 1
4
, 0 1, 2
3
, 0
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1
4
, 1
4
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4
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4
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4
, 1
4
, 0 1, 1
3
, 0
v¯1v¯2
1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1, 0,  1, 2
3
, 0
χ 1
3
, 0, 0 1
3
, 0, 0 2
3
, 0, 0 2
3
, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
2
v1v2 v1v¯2 v¯1v2 v¯1v¯2 χ
v1v2 0, 0, 1
1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1, 1
3
, 0
v1v¯2
1
4
, 1
4
, 0 0, 1, 1 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1, 2
3
, 0
v¯1v2
1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1, 0, 1 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1, 1
3
, 0
v¯1v¯2
1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 1
4
, 1
4
, 0 0, 1,  1, 2
3
, 0
χ 1
3
, 0, 0 1
3
, 0, 0 2
3
, 0, 0 2
3
, 0, 0 0, 1, 0
w
Fig. 6 A Γ pC, V q game corresponding to a 2-SAT instance with V “ tv1, v2u and C “
ttv1v2uu. By choosing her action, the third player (the leader) selects one of the three
matrices, while the first and the second players (the followers) select a row and a column,
respectively.
Proof Given a generic 3-SAT instance, let us build its corresponding game
Γ pC, V q, according to Definition 5. Clearly, this construction requires poly-
nomial time, because |A4| “ r ` 1 and |A| “ |A1| “ |A2| “ |A3| “ 8t ` 1,
which are polynomials in r and t, and, therefore, the number of outcomes in
Γ pC, V q is polynomial in r and t. Furthermore, let us select  P `0, 12r ˘ (the
polynomiality of the reduction is preserved as 12r is representable in binary
with a polynomial number of bits).
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By contradiction, let us assume that there exists a polynomial-time approx-
imation algorithm A capable of constructing an approximate solution to the
problem of computing a P-LFPNE with an approximation factor 12r . Observe
that, if the 3-SAT instance is a YES instance (i.e., if it is feasible), there exists
then a strategy x4 P ∆4 such that all the NEs of the resulting followers’ game
provide the leader with a utility of 1, since there is a region corresponding
to a truth assignment which makes all the clauses true. On the other hand,
if the 3-SAT instance is a NO instance (i.e., if it is not satisfiable), in each
region of the leader’s strategy space there exits then an NE for the followers’
game which provides the leader with a utility of . Due to the assumption of
pessimism, the followers would, then, always play such equilibrium.
It follows that, when applied to Γ pC, V q, A would return an approximate
solution with value greater than 12r if and only if the 3-SAT instance is feasible.
Since this would provide us with a solution to 3-SAT in polynomial time, we
conclude that P-LFPNE-s is not in Poly-APX unless P = NP. [\
5 Single-Level Reformulation and Restriction
We propose, in this section, a single-level reformulation of the problem ad-
mitting a supremum but, in general, not a maximum, and a corresponding
restriction which always admits optimal (restricted) solutions.
For notational simplicity, we consider, here, the case with n “ 3 players.
The generalisation to n ě 3 is, although notationally more involved, straight-
forward. With only two followers, Problem (2), i.e., the bilevel programming
formulation we gave in Subsection 3.2, reads:
sup
x3
min
x1,x2
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 x
a1
1 x
a2
2 x
a3
3
s.t. x3 P ∆3
x1 P argmax
x1
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a31 x
a1
1 x
a2
2 x
a3
3
s.t. x1 P ∆1 X t0, 1um
x2 P argmax
x2
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a32 x
a1
1 x
a2
2 x
a3
3
s.t. x2 P ∆2 X t0, 1um.
(3)
5.1 Single-Level Reformulation
In order to cast Problem (3) into a single-level problem, we introduce, first, a
reformulation of the followers’ problem:
Lemma 1 The following MILP, parametric in x3, is an exact reformulation
of the followers’ problem of, given a leader’s strategy x3, finding a pure NE
which minimises the leader’s utility:
min
y
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ya1a2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 x
a3
3 (4a)
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s.t.
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ya1a2 “ 1 (4b)
ya1a2
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a31 ´ Ua
1
1a2a3
1 qxa33 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1 (4c)
ya1a2
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a32 ´ Ua1a
1
2a3
2 qxa33 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2 (4d)
ya1a2 P Z` @a1 P A1, a2 P A2. (4e)
Proof Note that, in Problem (3), a solution to the followers’ problem satisfies
xa11 “ xa22 “ 1 for some pa1, a2q P A1ˆA2 and xa
1
1
1 “ xa
1
2
2 “ 0 for all pa11, a12q ‰pa1, a2q. Problem (4) encodes this in terms of the variable ya1a2 by imposing
ya1a2 “ 1 if an only if pa1, a2q is a pessimistic NE. Let us look at this in detail.
Due to Constraints (4b) and (4e), ya1a2 is equal to 1 for one and only pair
pa1, a2q.
Due to Constraints (4c) and (4d), for all pa1, a2q such that ya1a2 “ 1,
there can be no action a11 P A1 (respectively, a12 P A2) by which follower 1
(respectively, follower 2) could obtain a better payoff, assuming that the other
follower would play action a2 (respectively, action a1). This guarantees that
pa1, a2q be an NE. Also note that Constraints (4c) and (4d) boil down to the
tautology 0 ě 0 for any pa1, a2q P A1 ˆA2 with ya1a2 “ 0.
By minimising the objective function (corresponding to the leader’s utility),
a pessimistic pure NE is found. [\
To arrive at a single-level reformulation of Problem (3), we rely on linear
programming duality to restate Problem (4) in terms of optimality conditions
which do not employ the min operator. First, we show the following:
Lemma 2 The linear programming relaxation of Problem (4) is integer.
Proof Let us focus on Constraints (4c) and analyze, for all pa1, a2q P A1 ˆA2
and a11 P A1, the coefficient
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´ U
a11a2a3
1 qxa33 which multiplies
ya1a2 . The coefficient is equal to the regret player 1 would suffer from not play-
ing action a11. If equal to 0, we have the tautology 0 ě 0. If ą 0, we obtain, after
dividing by
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´U
a11a2a3
1 qxa33 both sides of the constraint, ya1a2 ě
0, which is subsumed by the nonnegativity of ya1a2 . If ă 0, we obtain, after
diving both sides of the constraint again by
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´ U
a11a2a3
1 qxa33 ,
ya1a2 ď 0, which implies ya1a2 “ 0. A similar reasoning applies to Con-
straints (4d).
Let us now define O as the set of pairs pa1, a2q such that there is as least
an action a11 or a12 for which one of the followers suffers from a strictly negative
regret. We have O :“ tpa1, a2q P A1 ˆ A2 : Da11 P A1 with
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´
U
a11a2a3
1 qxa33 ă 0_ Da12 P A2 with
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´ U
a1a
1
2a3
1 qxa33 ă 0u.
Relying on O, Problem (4) can be rewritten as:
min
y
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ya1a2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 x
a3
3
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s.t.
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ya1a2 “ 1
ya1a2 “ 0 @pa1, a2q P O
ya1a2 P Z` @a1 P A1, a2 P A2.
Since, after discarding all variables ya1a2 with pa1, a2q P O, we obtain a prob-
lem with a single all-one constraint (whose constraint matrix is, therefore,
totally unimodular), the integrality constraints can be dropped. [\
As a consequence of Lemma 2, the following can, finally, be established:
Theorem 3 The following single-level Quadratically Constrained Quadratic
Program (QCQP) is an exact reformulation of Problem (3):
sup
x3,y
β1,β2
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ya1a2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 x
a3
3 (5a)
s.t.
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ya1a2 “ 1 (5b)
ya1a2
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a31 ´ Ua
1
1a2a3
1 qxa33 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1 (5c)
ya1a2
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a32 ´ Ua1a
1
2a3
2 qxa33 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2 (5d)ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ya1a2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 x
a3
3 ď
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 x
a3
3 `
´ ÿ
a11PA1
β
a1a2a
1
1
1
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a31 ´ Ua
1
1a2a3
1 qxa33 `
´ ÿ
a12PA2
β
a1a2a
1
2
2
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a32 ´ Ua1a
1
2a3
2 qxa33 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2 (5e)
ÿ
a3PA3
x3 “ 1 (5f)
β
a1a2a
1
1
1 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1 (5g)
β
a1a2a
1
2
2 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2 (5h)
ya1a2 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2 (5i)
xa33 ě 0 @a3 P A3. (5j)
Proof First, by relying on Lemma 2, we introduce the linear programming dual
of the linear programming relaxation of Problem (4). Letting α, β
a1a2a
1
1
1 , and
β
a1a2a
1
2
2 be the dual variables of, respectively, Constraints (4b), (4c), and (4d),
the dual reads:
max
α,β1,β2
α
s.t. α`
ÿ
a11PA1
β
a1a2a
1
1
1
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a31 ´ Ua
1
1a2a3
1 qxa33 `
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`
ÿ
a12PA2
β
a1a2a
1
2
2
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a32 ´ Ua1a
1
2a3
2 qxa33
ď
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 x
a3
3 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2
α ě 0
β
a1a2a
1
1
1 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1
β
a1a2a
1
2
2 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2.
A set of optimality conditions for Problem (4) can then be derived by simul-
taneously imposing primal and dual feasibility for the sets of primal and dual
variables (by imposing the respective constraints) and equating the objective
functions of the two problems.
The dual variable α can be projected out from the resulting formulation
via Fourier-Motzkin elimination, leading to Constraints (5e).
The result in the claim is obtained after introducing the leader’s utility
as the objective function of the problem and then casting the problem as a
maximisation problem (in which a supremum is sought). [\
5.2 Unboundedness
Let us provide an interpretation of Problem (5) from a purely game-theoretical
perspective. As the left-hand side of each instance of Constraints (5e) is equal
to the leader’s utility function (which is maximised), Constraints (5e) account
for the maximin aspect of the problem, imposing that the leader’s utility be
nonlarger than the utility she could obtain in any of the NEs arising in the
followers’ game. Observe that, for each pa1, a2q P A1 ˆ A2, if Da11 P A1 :ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´U
a11a2a3
1 qxa33 ă 0 (and, thus, pa1, a2q is not an NE), the corre-
sponding constraint can be trivially satisfied by letting β
a1a2a
1
1
1 “ 8. Similarly,
for each pa1, a2q P A1 ˆ A2, if Da12 P A2 :
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a32 ´ U
a1a
1
2a3
2 qxa33 ă 0
(and, thus, pa1, a2q is not an NE), the corresponding constraint can be triv-
ially satisfied by letting β
a1a2a
1
2
2 “ 8. Differently, if the two aforementioned
coefficients are ě 0 for all a11 P A1 and for all a12 P A2, then, w.l.o.g.,
β
a1a2a
1
1
1 “ βa1a2a
1
2
2 “ 0, as this corresponds to imposing the smallest restriction
on the leader’s utility. In this case, in particular, the instance of Constraint (5e)
amounts to
ř
a1PA1
ř
a2PA2 y
a1a2
ř
a3PA3 U
a1a2a3
3 x
a3
3 ď
ř
a3PA3 U
a1a2a3
3 x
a3
3 , thus
imposing that the leader’s utility be nonlarger than the value she should obtain
at the NE corresponding to pair pa1, a2q.4
4 Let us note that the primal part of Problem (5) is necessary to obtain a bounded
objective function value. Indeed, a purely dual formulation where a dummy variable η is
maximised, subject to being upper bounded by all the right-hand sides in Constraints (5e),
but containing no primal part, would only be correct in case the followers’ game admitted a
pure NE for every x3 P ∆3. Indeed, if this were not the case, any x3 for which the followers’
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In line with the results in Proposition 3 of Subsection 3.3, the following
holds:
Proposition 7 In the general case, Problem (5) admits a supremum but not
a maximum. In particular, there is, in general, no finite upper bound on the
dual variables β
a1a2a
1
1
1 and β
a1a2a
1
2
2 whose introduction would not restrict the
set of optimal solutions of the problem.
Proof Since the leader’s objective function is bounded, Problem (5) clearly
admits a supremum. To show that, in the general case, the problem does not
admit a maximum over the reals, we show that there is at least a game instance
which admits a sequence of feasible solutions whose map under the objective
function converges to the supremum, while the series itself converges to a point
where the objective function value is strictly smaller than the supremum itself.
Consider once again the game introduced in the proof of Proposition 3. For this
game, letting x3 “ p1 ´ ρ, ρq for some ρ P r0, 1s, Constraints (5e) read for, in
order, pa1, a2q “ p1, 1q, pa1, a2q “ p1, 2q, pa1, a2q “ p2, 1q, and pa1, a2q “ p2, 2q,
as follows:
y11p0q ` y12p5` 5ρq ` y21p1q ` y22p0q ď 0´ β1111 p0.5´ ρq ´ β1122 p´1´ ρq
y11p0q ` y12p5` 5ρq ` y21p1q ` y22p0q ď 5` 5ρ´ β1221 p1` ρq ´ β1212 p1` ρq
y11p0q ` y12p5` 5ρq ` y21p1q ` y22p0q ď 1´ β2111 p´0.5` ρq ´ β2122 p´0.5` ρq
y11p0q ` y12p5` 5ρq ` y21p1q ` y22p0q ď 0´ β2211 p´1´ ρq ´ β2212 p0.5´ ρq.
As discussed in the proof of Proposition 3, this game admits two NEs
when ρ “ 0.5, namely, p1, 2q and p2, 1q. Letting y11 “ y22 “ 0 and ρ “ 0.5,
Constraints (5e) become:
7.5y12 ` y21 ď 0` 1.5β1122
7.5y12 ` y21 ď 7.5´ 1.5β1221 ´ 1.5β1212
7.5y12 ` y21 ď 1
7.5y12 ` y21 ď 0` 1.5β2211 .
As the left-hand side of each inequality corresponds to the objective func-
tion value (to be maximised), we look for nonnegative values for variables
β1122 , β
112
1 , β
121
2 , β
221
1 for which the right-hand sides are as large as possible.
W.l.o.g., we have β1221 “ β1212 “ 0 for the variables in the second constraint,
as the coefficients multiplying them are negative. As to the other two variables
contained in the first and fourth constraints, it suffices to let β1122 “ β2212 “ 5,
game admitted no pure NE would lead to positive coefficients in each of the right-hand
sides of Constraints (5e). Thus, by letting β
a1a2a
1
1
1 “ βa1a2a
1
2
2 “ 8 for all a1 P A1, a2 P
A2, a11 P A1, a12 P A2, η would be unbounded. This formulation would, though, be correct
for a variant of the problem tackled here where the leader looks for, primarily, a strategy x3
such that the followers’ game admits no NE and, only if this is not possible, for a strategy
maximising her utility in the worst-case NE.
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as, this way, the two right-hand sides become equal to 7.5, thus only imply-
ing a trivially valid upper bound on the objective function value (as, due to
y12 ` y21 “ 1, 7.5y12 ` y21 ď 7.5 holds). Overall, the four constraints impose
7.5y12 ` y21 ď mint7.5, 1u “ 1, which leads to a unique optimal solution of
value 1 with y21 “ 1.
Let now ρ “ 0.5 ´ , for some  P p0, 0.5s. Recall that, as shown in the
proof of Proposition 3, p1, 2q is the unique pure NE in the followers’ game for
 ă 0.5, while, for  “ 0.5, the game admits two NEs: p1, 2q and p2, 1q. Letting
y11 “ y22 “ 0 and ρ “ 0.5´ , Constraints (5e) read:
p7.5´ 5qy12 ` y21 ď 0´ β1121 ` p1.5´ qβ1112
p7.5´ 5qy12 ` y21 ď 7.5´ 5´ p1.5´ qβ1221 ´ p1.5´ qβ1212
p7.5´ 5qy12 ` y21 ď 1` β2111 ` β2122
p7.5´ 5qy12 ` y21 ď 0` p1.5´ qβ2211 ´ β2212 .
As  ď 0.5, the coefficients of β1121 , β1221 , β1212 , and β2212 are all negative and,
thus, we can let β1121 “ β1221 “ β1212 “ β2212 “ 0, w.l.o.g.. As to variables β1112
and β2211 , it suffices to impose β
111
2 “ β2211 “ 7.5´51.5´ , which corresponds to
bounding the objective function by 7.5´5—this is a trivially valid bound as,
since y12 and y21 are binary, p7.5´ 5qy12` y21 ď 7.5´ . As to variables β2111
and β2122 , it suffices to choose any pair of values satisfying β
211
1 `β2122 “ 7.5´5 ,
thanks to which the corresponding constraint becomes p7.5 ´ 5qy12 ` y21 ď
7.5´ 5. With these choices, the four constraints boil down to p7.5´ 5qy12 `
y21 ď 7.5´ 5, thus leading to an objective function value of 7.5´ 5.
As it is clear, 7.5 ´ 5 Ñ 7.5 when  Ñ 0, which is in contrast to what
we previously derived, namely, that the leader’s utility is equal to 1 for  “ 0.
This shows that 7.5 is a supremum, but not a maximum.
The unboundedness of the dual variables β
a1a2a
1
1
1 and β
a1a2a
1
2
2 follows by
noting that, for Ñ 0, β2111 ` β2122 “ 7.5´5 Ñ8. [\
5.3 A Restricted Single-Level (MILP) Formulation
We consider, here, the option of introducing an upper bound of M on both
β
a1a2a
1
1
1 and β
a1a2a
1
2
2 , for all a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1, a12 P A2. Due to the
continuity of the objective function, this suffices to obtain a formulation which,
although being a restriction of the original one, always admits a maximum
(over the reals) as a consequence of Weierstrass’ theorem. Quite conveniently,
this restricted reformulation can be cast as an MILP, as we now show.
Theorem 4 The following MILP formulation is an exact reformulation of
Problem (5) for the case where β
a1a2a
1
1
1 ď M and βa1a2a
1
2
2 ď M hold for all
a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1, a12 P A2, and a restricted one when these bounds are
not valid:
max
y,x3,z
q1,q2,p1,p2
ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 z
a1a2a3 (7a)
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ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ya1a2 “ 1 (7b)
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a31 ´ Ua
1
1a2a3
1 qza1a2a3 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1 (7c)
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a32 ´ Ua1a
1
2a3
2 qza1a2a3 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2 (7d)ÿ
a1PA1
ÿ
a2PA2
ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 z
a1a2a3 ď ÿ
a3PA3
Ua1a2a33 x
a3
3 `
´M ÿ
a11PA1
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a31 ´ Ua
1
1a2a3
1 qqa1a2a
1
1a3
1 `
´M ÿ
a12PA2
ÿ
a3PA3
pUa1a2a32 ´ Ua1a
1
2a3
2 qqa1a2a
1
2a3
2 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2 (7e)
ÿ
a3PA3
xa33 “ 1 (7f)
za1a2a3 ě xa33 ` ya1a2 ´ 1 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a3 P A3 (7g)
za1a2a3 ď xa33 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a3 P A3 (7h)
za1a2a3 ď ya1a2 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a3 P A3 (7i)
q
a1a2a
1
1a3
1 ě xa33 ` pa1a2a
1
1
1 ´ 1 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1, a3 P A3 (7j)
q
a1a2a
1
1a3
1 ď xa33 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1, a3 P A3 (7k)
q
a1a2a
1
1a3
1 ď pa1a2a
1
1
1 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1, a3 P A3 (7l)
q
a1a2a
1
2a3
2 ě xa33 ` pa1a2a
1
2
2 ´ 1 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2, a3 P A3 (7m)
q
a1a2a
1
2a3
2 ď xa33 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2, a3 P A3 (7n)
q
a1a2a
1
2a3
2 ď pa1a2a
1
2
2 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2, a3 P A3 (7o)
xa33 ě 0 @a3 P A3 (7p)
ya1a2 P t0, 1u @a1 P A1, a2 P A2 (7q)
p
a1a2a
1
1
1 P t0, 1u @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1 (7r)
p
a1a2a
1
2
2 P t0, 1u @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2 (7s)
za1a2a3 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a3 P A3 (7t)
q
a1a2a
1
1a3
1 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1, a3 P A3 (7u)
q
a1a2a
1
2a3
2 ě 0 @a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a12 P A2, a3 P A3. (7v)
Proof After introducing the variable za1a2a3 , each bilinear product ya1a2xa33 in
Problem (5) can be linearised by substituting za1a2a3 for it and introducing the
McCormick Envelope Constraints (7g)–(7i), which are sufficient to guarantee
za1a2a3 “ ya1a2xa33 if ya1a2 takes binary values [14]. Assuming βa1a2a
1
1
1 P r0,M s
for each a1 P A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1, we can clearly restrict ourselves to
β
a1a2a
1
1
1 P t0,Mu. We can, therefore, introduce the variable pa1a2a
1
1
1 P t0, 1u,
substituting Mp
a1a2a
1
1
1 for each occurrence of β
a1a2a
1
1
1 . This way, for each a1 P
A1, a2 P A2, a11 P A1, the term βa1a2a
1
1
1
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´ U
a11a2a3
1 qxa33 becomes
M
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´U
a11a2a3
1 qpa1a2a
1
1
1 x
a3
3 . We can, then, introduce the variable
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q
a1a2a
1
1a3
1 and impose q
a1a2a
1
1a3
1 “ pa1a2a
1
1
1 x
a3
3 via the McCormick Envelope Con-
straints (7j)–(7l). This way, the term M
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´U
a11a2a3
1 qpa1a2a
1
1
1 x
a3
3
becomes the completely linear termM
ř
a11PA1
ř
a3PA3pUa1a2a31 ´U
a11a2a3
1 qqa1a2a
1
1a3
1 .
Similar arguments hold for β
a1a2a
1
2
2 , leading to the introduction of Constraints (7m)–
(7o). [\
The impact of bounding β
a1a2a
1
1
1 and β
a1a2a
1
2
2 by M is explained as follows.
Assume that those upper bounds are introduced into Problem (5). If M is not
large enough for the chosen x3 (remember that, as shown in Proposition 7,
one may need M Ñ8 for x3 approaching a discontinuity point of the leader’s
utility function), Constraints (5e) may remain active for some paˆ1, aˆ2q which
is not an NE for the chosen x3. Let pa1, a2q be the worst-case NE the followers
would play and assume that the right-hand side of Constraint (5e) for paˆ1, aˆ2q
is strictly smaller than the utility the leader would obtain if the followers played
the NE pa1, a2q, namely, řa3PA3 U aˆ1aˆ2a33 xa33 ´řa11PA1 βaˆ1aˆ2a111 řa3PA3pU aˆ1aˆ2a31 ´
U
a11aˆ2a3
1 qxa33 ´
ř
a12PA2 β
aˆ1aˆ2a
1
2
2
ř
a3PA3pU aˆ1aˆ2a32 ´U
aˆ1a
1
2a3
2 qxa33 ă
ř
a3PA3 U
a1a2a3
3 x
a3
3 .
Since, by letting ya1a2 “ 1, the constraint would be violated (as, with that
value of y, the left-hand side of the constraint would be
ř
a3PA3 U
a1a2a3
3 x
a3
3 ,
which we assumed to be strictly larger than the right-hand side), this forces
the choice of a different x3 for which the upper bound of M on β
a1a2a
1
1
1 and
β
a1a2a
1
2
2 is sufficiently large not to cause the same issue with the worst-case NE
corresponding to that x3, thus restricting the set of strategies the leader could
play.
In spite of this, by solving Problem (5), we are always guaranteed to find
optimal (restricted) solutions to it (if M is large enough for the restricted
problem to admit feasible solutions). Such solutions correspond to feasible
strategies of the leader, guaranteeing her a lower bound on her utility at a
P-LFPNE.
6 Exact Algorithm
We propose, in this section, an exact exponential-time algorithm for the com-
putation of a P-LFPNE, i.e., of supxnP∆n fpxnq, which does not suffer from
the shortcomings of the formulations we introduced in the previous section.
In particular, if there is no xn P ∆n where the leader’s utility fpxnq achieves
supxnP∆n fpxnq (as fpxnq does not admit a maximum), our algorithm also
returns, together with the supremum, a strategy xˆn which provides the leader
with a utility equal to an α-approximation (in the additive sense) of the supre-
mum, namely, a strategy xn satisfying supxnP∆n fpxnq ´ fpxˆnq ď α, for any
α ą 0 chosen a priori. We first introduce, in Subsection 6.1, a version of the
algorithm based on explicit enumeration, which we then embed, in Subsec-
tion 6.2, into a branch-and-bound scheme.
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In the remainder of the section, we denote the closure of a set X Ď ∆n
relative to affp∆nq by X, its boundary relative to affp∆nq by bdpXq, and its
complement relative to ∆n by X
c. Note that, here, affp∆nq denotes the affine
hull of ∆n, i.e., the hyperplane in Rm containing ∆n.
6.1 Enumerative Algorithm
6.1.1 Computing supxnP∆n fpxnq
The key ingredient of our algorithm is what we call outcome configurations.
Letting AF “ŚpPF Ap, we say that, for a given xn P ∆n, a pair pS`, S´q with
S` Ď AF and S´ “ AF zS` is an outcome configuration if, in the followers’
game induced by xn, all the followers’ action profiles a´n P S` constitute an
NE and all the action profiles a´n P S´ do not.
For every a´n P AF , we define Xpa´nq as the set of all leader’s strategies
xn P ∆n for which a´n is an NE in the followers’ game induced by xn. Formally,
Xpa´nq corresponds to the following (closed) polytope:
Xpa´nq :“
$&%xn P ∆n :
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,anp x
an
n ě
ÿ
anPAn
U
a1´n,an
p x
an
n @p P F, a1p P Apztapu
with a1´ n “ pa1, . . . , ap´1, a1p, ap`1, . . . , an´1q
,.- .
For each a´n P AF , we also introduce the set Xcpa´nq of all xn P ∆n for
which a´n is not an NE. For that purpose, we first define, for each p P F , the
following set:
Dppa´n, a1pq :“
$&%xn P ∆n :
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,anp x
an
n ă
ÿ
anPAn
U
a1´n,an
p x
an
n
with a1´ n “ pa1, . . . , ap´1, a1p, ap`1, . . . , an´1q
,.- .
Dppa´n, a1pq, which is a not open nor closed polytope (as it has a missing
facet, the one corresponding to its strict inequality), is the set of all values
of xn for which player p would achieve a better utility by deviating from a´n
and playing a different action a1p P Ap. Since, in principle, any player could
deviate from a´n by playing any action not in a´n, Xcpa´nq is the following
disjunctive set:
Xcpa´nq :“
ď
pPF
¨˝ ď
a1pPApztapu
Dppa´n, a1pq‚˛.
Notice that, since any point in bdpXcpa´nqq which is not in bdp∆nq would
satisfy, for some a1p, the (strict, originally) inequality of Dppa´n, a1pq as an
equation, such point is not in Xcpa´nq and, hence, bdpXcpa´nqqXXcpa´nq Ď
bdp∆nq. The closure Xcpa´nq of Xcpa´nq is obtained by turning the strict
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Xpa´nq Xcpa´nq Xcpa´nq
Fig. 7 An illustration of Xpa´nq, Xcpa´nq, and Xcpa´nq for the case with m “ 3. The
three sets are depicted as subsets (highlighted in gray and continuous lines) of the leader’s
strategy space ∆n. Dashed lines and circles indicate parts of ∆n which are not contained
in the sets.
constraint in the definition of each Dppa´n, a1pq into a nonstrict one. An il-
lustration of Xpa´nq and Xcpa´nq, together with the closure Xcpa´nq of the
latter, is reported in Figure 7.
For every outcome configuration pS`, S´q, we introduce the following sets:
XpS`q :“
č
a´nPS`
Xpa´nq
and
XpS´q :“
č
a´nPS´
Xcpa´nq.
While the former is a closed polytope, the latter is the union of not open
nor closed polytopes and, thus, it is not open nor closed itself. Similarly to
Xcpa´nq, XpS´q satisfies bdpXpS´qqXXpS´q Ď bdp∆nq. The closure XpS´q
of XpS´q is obtained by taking the closure of each Xcpa´nq. Hence, XpS´q “Ş
a´nPS´ X
cpa´nq.
By leveraging these definitions, we can now focus on the set of all leader’s
strategies which realize the outcome configuration pS`, S´q, namely:
XpS`q XXpS´q.
As for XpS´q, XpS`qXXpS´q is not an open nor a closed set. Due to XpS`q
being closed, the only points of bdpXpS`qXXpS´qq which are not in XpS`qX
XpS´q itself are the very points in bdpXpS´qq which are not in XpS´q. As a
consequence, XpS`q XXpS´q “ XpS`q XXpS´q.
Let us define the set P :“ tpS`, S´q : S` P 2AF ^ S´ “ 2AF zS`u, which
contains all the outcome configurations of the game. The following theorem
highlights the structure of fpxnq, suggesting an iterative way of expressing the
problem of computing supxnP∆n fpxnq. We will rely on it when designing our
algorithm.
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Theorem 5 Let ψpxn;S`q :“ min
a´nPS`
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,anxann . The following holds:
sup
xnP∆n
fpxnq “ maxpS`,S´qPP :
XpS`qXXpS´q‰H
max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q
ψpxn;S`q.
Proof Let ∆1n be the set of leader’s strategies xn for which there exists a
pure NE in the followers’ game induced by xn, namely, ∆
1
n :“ txn P ∆n :
fpxnq ą ´8u. Since, by definition, fpxnq “ ´8 for any xn R ∆1n and the
supremum of fpxnq is finite due to the finiteness of the payoffs (and assuming
the followers’ game admits at least a pure NE for some xn P ∆n), we can,
w.l.o.g., focus on ∆1n and solve supxnP∆1n fpxnq. In particular, the collection
of the sets XpS`q X XpS´q ‰ H which are obtained for all pS`, S´q P P
forms a partition of ∆1n. Due to the fact that, at any xn P XpS`q XXpS´q,
the only pure NEs induced by xn in the followers’ game are those in S
`,
fpxnq “ ψpxn;S`q. Since, as it is clear, the supremum of a function defined
over a set is equal to the largest of the suprema of that function over the
subsets of such set, we have:
sup
xnP∆n
fpxnq “ maxpS`,S´qPP :
XpS`qXXpS´q‰H
sup
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q
ψpxn;S`q.
What remains to show is that, for all XpS`q XXpS´q ‰ H, the following
relationship holds:
sup
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q
ψpxn;S`q “ max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q
ψpxn;S`q.
Since ψpxn;S`q is a continuous function (it is the point-wise minimum of
finitely many continuous functions), its supremum over XpS`qXXpS´q equals
its maximum over the closure XpS`q XXpS´q of that set. Hence, the rela-
tionship follows due to XpS`q XXpS´q “ XpS`q XXpS´q. [\
In particular, Theorem 5 shows that fpxnq is a piecewise function with a
piece for each set XpS`q XXpS´q, each of which corresponding to the (con-
tinuous over its domain) piecewise-affine function ψpxn;S`q. It follows that
the only discontinuities of fpxnq, due to which fpxnq may admit a supre-
mum but not a maximum, are those where, in ∆n, xn transitions from a set
XpS`q XXpS´q to another one.
We show how to translate the formula in Theorem 5 into an algorithm by
proving the following theorem:
Theorem 6 There exists a finite, exponential-time algorithm which computes
supxnP∆n fpxnq and, whenever supxnP∆n fpxnq “ maxxnP∆n fpxnq, also re-
turns a strategy xn˚ with fpxn˚q “ maxxnP∆n fpxnq.
Proof The algorithm relies on the expression given in Theorem 5. All pairs
pS`, S´q P P can be constructed by enumeration in time exponential in the
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size of the instance.5 In particular, the set P contains 2m
n´1
outcome configu-
rations, each corresponding to a bi-partition of the outcomes of the followers’
game into S` and S´ (there are mn´1 such outcomes, due to having m actions
and n´ 1 followers).
Let us define, for every p P F , the following sets, parametric in  ě 0:
Dppa´n, a1p; q :“
$&%xn P ∆n :
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,anp x
an
n `  ď
ÿ
anPAn
U
a1´n,an
p x
an
n
with a1´ n “ pa1, . . . , ap´1, a1p, ap`1, . . . , an´1q
,.- ,
Xcpa´n; q :“
ď
pPF
¨˝ ď
a1pPApztapu
Dppa´n, a1p; q‚˛,
XpS´; q :“
č
a´nPS´
Xcpa´n; q.
Notice that, when  “ 0, we haveDppa´n, a1p; 0q “ Dppa´n, a1pq andXpS´; 0q “
XpS´q. Hence, we can verify whether XpS`q X XpS´q ‰ H by verifying
whether there exists some  ą 0 such that XpS`q XXpS´; q ‰ H. This can
be done by solving the following problem and checking the strict positivity of
 in its solution:
max
,xn

s.t. xn P XpS`q XXpS´; q
 ě 0
xn P ∆n.
(8)
Problem (8) can be cast as an MILP. To see this, observe that each Xcpa´n; q
can be expressed as an MILP with a binary variable for each term of the
disjunction which composes it, namely:ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,anp x
an
n `  ď
ÿ
anPAn
U
a1´n,an
p x
an
n `Ma´n,a
1
p
p z
a´n,a1p
p
@p P F, a1p P Apztapu,with a1´ n “ pa1, . . . , ap´1, a1p, ap`1, . . . , an´1q (9a)ÿ
pPF
ÿ
a1pPApztapu
p1´ za´n,a
1
p
p q “ 1 (9b)
z
a´n,a1p
p P t0, 1u @p P F, a1p P Apztapu (9c)
xn P ∆n (9d)
 ě 0. (9e)
In Constraints (9), the constantM
a´n,a1p
p , which satisfiesM
a´n,a1p
p “ maxanPAntUa´n,anp ´
U
a1´n,an
p u, is key to deactivate any instance of Constraints (9a) when the corre-
sponding z
a´n,a1p
p is equal to 1. The set XpS´; q is obtained by simultaneously
imposing Constraints (9) for all a´n P S´.
5 Recall that the size of a game instance is Ωpmnq.
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After verifying XpS`q XXpS´q ‰ H by solving Problem (8), the value of
max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q ψpxn;S`q can be computed in, at most, exponential time
by solving the following MILP:
max
η,xn
η
s.t. η ď
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,ann x
an
n @a´n P S`
xn P XpS`q XXpS´; 0q
η P R
xn P ∆n,
(10)
where the first constraint accounts for the maxmin aspect of the problem. The
largest value of η found over all sets XpS`q X XpS´q, for all pS`, S´q P P ,
corresponds to supxnP∆n fpxnq.
To verify whether fpxnq admits maxxnP∆n fpxnq and, if it does, compute
it, we solve, in the algorithm, the following problem (rather than the afore-
mentioned max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q ψpxn;S`q):
lex–max
ě0,xnPXpS`qXXpS´;q
rψpxn;S`q; s. (11)
This problem calls for a pair pxn, q with xn P XpS`q X XpS´; q such that,
among all pairs which maximise ψpxn;S`q,  is as large as possible. This way,
in any solution pxn, q with  ą 0 we have xn P XpS`q XXpS´q (rather than
xn P XpS`q X XpS´q). Since, there, ψpxn;S`q “ fpxnq, we conclude that
fpxnq admits a maximum (equal to the value of the supremum) if  ą 0,
whereas it only admits a supremum if  “ 0.
Problem (11) can be solved in, at most, exponential time by solving the
following lex-MILP:
max
η,xn,
rη ; s
s.t. η ď
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,ann x
an
n @a´n P S`
xn P XpS`q XXpS´; q
η P R
 ě 0
xn P ∆n,
(12)
where η is maximised first, and  second. In practice, it suffices to solve two
MILPs in sequence: one in which the first objective function is maximised, and
then another one in which the second objective function is maximised after
imposing the first objective function to be equal to its optimal value. [\
6.1.2 Finding an α-Approximate Strategy
For those cases where fpxnq does not admit a maximum, we look for a strategy
xˆn such that, for a given α ą 0, supxnP∆n fpxnq ´ fpxˆnq ď α, i.e., for an
(additively) α-approximate strategy xˆn. Its existence is guaranteed by the
following lemma.
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Lemma 3 Consider the sets X Ď Rn, for some n P N, and Y Ď R, and a
function f : X Ñ Y with s :“ supxPX fpxq, satisfying s ă 8. Then, for any
α P p0, ss, there exists an x P X : s´ fpxq ď α.
Proof By negating the conclusion, we deduce the existence of some α P p0, ss
such that, for every x P X, s ´ fpxq ą α. But, then, for all x P X, we have
fpxq ă s´α, which implies s “ supxPX fpxq ď s´α ă s: a contradiction. [\
After running the algorithm we outlined in the proof of Theorem 5 to
compute the value of the supremum, an α-approximate strategy xˆn can be
computed, a posteriori, thanks to the following result:
Theorem 7 Assume that fpxnq does not admit a maximum over ∆n and
that, according to the formula in Theorem 5, s :“ supxnP∆n fpxnq is attained
at some outcome configuration pS`, S´q. Then, an α-approximate strategy xˆn
can be computed for any α ą 0 in, at most, exponential time by solving the
following MILP:
max
,xn

s.t.
ÿ
anPAn
Ua´n,ann x
an
n ě s´ α @a´n P S`
xn P XpS`q XXpS´; q
 ě 0
xn P ∆n.
(13)
Proof Let xn˚ P XpS` X S´q be the strategy where the supremum is at-
tained according to the formula in Theorem 5, namely, where ψpxn˚, S`q “
max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q ψpxn;S`q “ s. Problem (13) calls for a solution xn of
value at least s´α (thus, for an α-approximate strategy) belonging to XpS`qX
XpS´; q with  as large as possible, whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 3.
Let pxˆn, ˆq be an optimal solution to Problem (13). If ˆ ą 0, xˆn P XpS`q X
XpS´q (rather than xˆn P XpS`q X XpS´q). Thus, fpxnq is continuous at
xn “ xˆn, implying ψpxn;S`q “ fpxnq. Therefore, by playing xˆn, the leader
achieves a utility of, at least, s´ α. [\
6.1.3 Outline of the Explicit Enumeration Algorithm
The complete enumerative algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 1. In the pseu-
docode, CheckEmptynesspS`, S´q is a subroutine which looks for a value of
 ě 0 which is optimal for Problem (8), while Solve-lex-MILPpS`, S´q is an-
other subroutine which solves Problem (12). Due to the lexicographic nature
of the algorithm, fpxnq admits a maximum if and only the algorithm returns
a solution with best.˚ ą 0, whereas, if best.˚ “ 0, xn˚ is just a strategy
where supxnP∆n fpxnq is attained (in the sense of Theorem 5). In the latter
case, an α-approximate strategy is found by invoking the procedure Solve-
MILP-approxpbest.S`, best.S´, best valueq, which solves Problem (13) on the
outcome configuration pbest.S`, best.S´q on which the supremum has been
found.
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Algorithm 1 Explicit Enumeration
1: function Explicit Enumeration
2: bestÐ nil
3: best valÐ ´8
4: for all S` P AF do
5: S´ Ð AF zS`
6: p, ¨q Ð CheckEmptynesspS`, S´q Ź Solve MILP Problem (8)
7: if  ą 0 then
8: pη, ˚, xn˚q Ð Solve-lex-MILPpS`, S´q Ź Solve lex-MILP Problem (12)
9: if η ą best val then
10: bestÐ pS`, S´, xn˚ , ˚q
11: best valÐ η
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: if best.˚ “ 0 then
16: xˆn Ð best.xn
17: else
18: xˆn Ð Solve-MILP-approxpbest.S`, best.S´, best valqŹ Solve MILP Problem (13)
19: end if
20: return best val, best.xn˚ , xˆn
21: end function
6.2 Branch-and-Bound Algorithm
As it is clear, computing supxnP∆n fpxnq with the enumerative algorithm can
be impractical for any game of interesting size, as it requires the explicit enu-
meration of all the outcome configurations of a game—many of which will,
incidentally, yield empty regions XpS`qXXpS´q. A more efficient algorithm,
albeit one still running in exponential time in the worst-case, can be designed
by relying on a branch-and-bound scheme.
6.2.1 Computing supxnP∆n fpxnq
Rather than defining S´ “ AF zS`, assume now S´ Ď AF zS`. In this case,
we call the corresponding pair pS`, S´q a relaxed outcome configuration.
Starting from any followers’ action profile a´n P AF with Xpa´nq ‰ H, the
algorithm constructs and explores, through a sequence of branching operations,
two search trees, whose nodes correspond to relaxed outcome configurations.
One tree accounts for the case where a´n is an NE and contains the relaxed
outcome configuration pS`, S´q “ pta´nu,Hq as root node. The other tree
accounts for the case where a´n is not an NE, featuring as root node the
relaxed outcome configuration pS`, S´q “ pH, ta´nuq.
If S´ Ă AF zS` (which can often be the case when relaxed outcome config-
urations are adopted), solving max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q ψpxn;S`q might not give a
strategy xn for which the only pure NEs in the followers’ game it induces are
those in S`, even if xn P XpS`qXXpS´q (rather than xn P XpS`qXXpS´q).
This is because, due to S` Y S´ Ă AF , there might be another action profile,
say a1´ n P AF zpS` Y S´q, providing the leader with a utility strictly smaller
Computing Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria: the Mixed-Pure Case 37
than that corresponding to all the action profiles in S`. Since, if this is the
case, the followers would respond to xn by playing a
1´
n rather than any of
the action profiles in S`, max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q ψpxn;S`q could be, in general,
strictly larger than supxnP∆n fpxnq, thus not being a valid candidate for the
computation of the latter.
In order to detect whether one such a1´ n exists, it suffices to carry out a
feasibility check (on xn) by looking for, in the followers’ game, a pure NE differ-
ent from those in S´ (which may become NEs on bdpXpS`q XXpS´q) which
minimises the leader’s utility—this can be done by inspection in Opmn´1q.
If the feasibility check returns some a1´ n R S`, the branch-and-bound tree is
expanded by performing a branching operation. Two nodes are introduced: a
left node with pS`L , S´L q where S`L “ S` Y ta1´ nu and S´L “ S´ (which ac-
counts for the case where a1´ n is a pure NE), and a right node with pS`R , S´R q
where S`R “ S` and S´R “ S´ Y ta1´ nu (which accounts for the case where
a1´ n is not a pure NE). If, differently, a1´ n P S`, then ψpxn;S`q represents a
valid candidate for the computation of supxnP∆n fpxnq and, thus, no further
branching is needed (and pS`, S´q is a leaf node).
The bounding aspect of the algorithm is a consequence of the following
proposition:
Proposition 8 Solving max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q ψpxn;S`q for some relaxed out-
come configuration pS`, S´q gives an upper bound on the leader’s utility under
the assumption that all followers’ action profiles in S` constitute an NE and
those in S´ do not.
Proof Due to pS`, S´q being a relaxed outcome configuration, there could be
outcomes not in S` which are NEs for some xn P XpS`q X XpS´q. Due to
ψpxn;S`q being defined as mina´nPS`
ř
anPAn U
a´n,anxann , ignoring any such
NE at any xn P XpS`q XXpS´q can only result in the min operator running
on fewer outcomes a´n, thus overestimating ψpxn;S`q and, ultimately, fpxnq.
The claim, thus, follows. [\
As a consequence of Proposition 8, optimal values obtained when computing
the value of max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q ψpxn;S`q throughout the search tree can be
used as bounds as in a standard branch-and-bound method.
Since max
xnPXpS`qXXpS´q ψpxn;S`q is not well-defined for nodes where
S` “ H, for them we solve, rather than an instance of Problem (12), a re-
striction of the optimistic problem (see Section 3) with constraints imposing
that all followers’ action profiles in S´ are not NEs. We employ the following
formulation, which we introduce directly for the lexicographic case:
max
y,xn,
« ÿ
aPA
U
a´n,an
n y
a´nxann ; 
ff
(14a)
s.t.
ÿ
a´nPAF
ya´n “ 1 (14b)
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ya´n
ÿ
anPAn
pUa´n,anp ´ Ua
1´
n,an
p qxann ě 0 @p P F, a´n P AF , a1p P Apztapu
with a1´ n “ a1, . . . , ap´1, a1p, ap`1, . . . , an´1 (14c)
ya´n P t0, 1u @a´n P AF (14d)
xn P ∆n (14e)
xn P XpS´; q. (14f)
The problem can be turned into a lex-MILP by linearizing each bilinear prod-
uct ya´nxann by means of McCormick’s envelope and by restating Constraint (14f)
as done in the MILP Constraints (9).
6.2.2 Finding an α-Approximate Strategy
Notice that, in the context of the branch-and-bound algorithm, an α-approximate
strategy xˆn cannot be found by just relying on the a posteriori procedure out-
lined in Theorem 7. This is because, when pS`, S´q is a relaxed outcome
configuration, there might be an action profile a1´ n P AF zpS` Y S´q (i.e., one
not accounted for in the relaxed outcome configuration) which not only is a
NE in the followers’ game induced by xˆn, but which also provides the leader
with a utility strictly smaller than ψpxˆn;S`q. If this is the case, the strat-
egy xˆn found with the procedure of Theorem 7 may return a utility arbitrarily
smaller than the supremum s and, in particular, smaller than s´ α.
To cope with this shortcoming and establish whether such an a1´ n exists,
we first compute xˆn according to the a posteriori procedure of Theorem 7 and,
then, perform a feasibility check. If we obtain an action profile a1´ n P S`, xˆn
is then an α-approximate strategy and the algorithm halts. If, differently, we
obtain some a1´ n R S` for which the leader obtains a utility strictly smaller
than ψpxˆn;S`q, we carry out a branching operation, creating a left and a right
child node in which a1´ n is added to, respectively, S` or S´. This procedure
is then applied on both nodes, recursively, until a strategy xˆn for which the
feasibility check returns an action profile in S` is found. Such a strategy is,
by construction, α-approximate.
Observe that, due to the correctness of the algorithm for the computation
of the supremum, there cannot be at xn˚ an NE a
1´
n worse than the worst-case
one in S`. If a new outcome a1´ n becomes the worst-case NE at xˆn, due to
the fact that it is not a worst-case NE at xn˚, there must be a strategy x˜n
which is a convex combination of xn˚ and xˆn where either a
1´
n is not an NE
or, if it is, it yields a leader’s utility not worse than that obtained with the
worst-case NE in S`. An α-approximate strategy is thus guaranteed to be
found on the segment joining x˜n and xn˚ by applying Lemma 3 with X equal
to that segment. Thus, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge.
6.2.3 Outline of the Branch-and-Bound Algorithm
The complete outline of the branch-and-bound algorithm is detailed in Al-
gorithm 2. F is the frontier of the two search trees, containing all nodes
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Algorithm 2 Branch-and-Bound
1: function Branch-and-Bound
2: bestÐ nil, lbÐ ´8, ubÐ8
3: F Ð Initialize()
4: while F ‰ H do
5: nodeÐ F .pickpq
6: if node.ub ą lb then
7: a´n Ð FeasibilityCheckpnode.xn˚ , node.S´q
8: if a´n P node.S` then
9: bestÐ pnode.S`, node.S´, node.xn˚ , node.˚q
10: lbÐ node.ub
11: else
12: S`L “ node.S` Y ta´nu
13: F Ð F ` CreateNodepS`L , node.S´q
14: S´R “ node.S´ Y ta´nu
15: F Ð F ` CreateNodepnode.S`, S´R q
16: end if
17: ubÐ max
nodePF tnode.ubu
18: end if
19: end while
20: if best.˚ “ 0 then
21: xˆn Ð best.xn˚
22: else
23: xˆn Ð Solve-MILP-approxpbest.S`, best.S´, best valqŹ Solve MILP Problem (13)
24: a1´ n Ð FeasibilityCheckpxˆn, best.S´q
25: if a1´ n R best.S` then
26: xˆn Ð Branch-and-Bound-approxpbest.S`, best.S´, best.xn˚q
27: end if
28: end if
29: return ub, best.xn˚ , xˆn
30: end function
which have yet to be explored. Initializepq is a subprocedure which creates
the root nodes of the two search trees, while pickpq extracts from F the
next node to be explored. FeasibilityCheckpxn, S´q performs the feasibility
check operation for the leader’s strategy xn, looking for the worst-case pure
NE in the game induced by xn and ignoring any outcome in S
´. CreateN-
odepS`, S´q (detailed in Algorithm 3) adds a new node to F , also comput-
ing its upper bound and the corresponding values of xn and . More specif-
ically, CreateNodepS`, S´q performs the same operations of a generic step
of the enumerative procedure in Algorithm 1 for a given S` and S´, with
the only difference that, here, we invoke the subprocedure Solve-lex-MILP-
OptpS`, S´q whenever S` “ H, by which Problem (14) is solved, while we
invoke Solve-lex-MILPpS`, S´q, which solves Problem (12), if S` ‰ H. In
the last part of the algorithm, Solve-MILP-approxpbest.S`, best.S´, best valq
attempts to compute an α-approximate strategy as done in Algorithm 1.
In case the feasibility check fails for it, we resort to calling the procedure
Branch-and-Bound-approxpbest.S`, best.S´, best.xn˚q which runs a second branch-
and-bound method, as described in Subsection 6.2.2, until an α-approximate
solution is found.
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Algorithm 3 CreateNode
1: function CreateNode(S`, S´)
2: p, ¨q Ð CheckEmptynesspS`, S´q Ź Solve MILP Problem (8)
3: if  ą 0 then
4: nodeÐ EmptyNodepq
5: node.S` Ð S`
6: node.S´ Ð S´
7: if S` “ H then
8: pη, ˚, xn˚q Ð Solve-lex-MILP-OptpS`, S´q Ź Solve lex-MILP Problem (14)
9: else
10: pη, ˚, xn˚q Ð Solve-lex-MILPpS`, S´q Ź Solve lex-MILP Problem (12)
11: end if
12: node.ubÐ η
13: node.xn˚ Ð xn˚
14: node.˚ Ð ˚
15: return node
16: end if
17: return H
18: end function
7 Experimental Evaluation
We carry out, in this section, an experimental evaluation of the equilibrium-
finding algorithms introduced in the previous sections. In particular, we com-
pare three methods:
– QCQP: the QCQP Formulation (5), which we solve with the state-of-the-
art spatial-branch-and-bound code BARON [20]; note that, as indicated
in [20], global optimality cannot be guaranteed by BARON if the feasible
region of the problem at hand is not bounded, which is the case of Formu-
lation (5). Hence, solutions obtained with QCQP are, in the general case,
feasible but not necessarily optimal.
– MILP: the MILP Formulation (7), with dual variables artificially bounded
by M , which we solve with the state-of-the-art MILP solver Gurobi 7.0.2;
experiments with different values of M are reported.
– BnB-sup: the ad hoc branch-and-bound algorithm we proposed, described
in Subsection 6.2 and better detailed in Algorithm 2, which we run to
compute supxnP∆n fpxnq, i.e., the supremum of the leader’s utility. The
algorithm is coded in Python 2.7. The different MILP subproblems that
are encountered during its execution are solved with Gurobi 7.0.2.
– BnB-α: the ad hoc branch-and-bound algorithm we proposed, run to find,
if there is no xn P ∆n at which the value of the supremum is attained,
an α-approximate strategy. Results obtained with different values of α are
illustrated.
We conduct our experiments on a testbed of normal-form game instances
built with GAMUT, a widely adopted suite of game instance generators [17].
All the game instances we used are of RandomGame class, with their payoffs
independently drawn from a uniform distribution with values in the range
r1, 100s. The testbed contains games with n “ 3, 4, 5 players (i.e., with 2, 3, 4
Computing Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria: the Mixed-Pure Case 41
followers). We generate instances with m P t4, 6, . . . , 20, 25, . . . , 70u actions
when n “ 3, and m P t3, 4, . . . , 15u actions when n “ 4, 5. In order to obtain
statistically more robust results, the testbed includes 30 different instances for
each pair of n and m.
Throughout the experiments and for each algorithm, we collect the follow-
ing figures for each game, which we then average over all the 30 game instances
in the testbed with the same values of n and m:
– Time: computing time, in seconds and up to the time limit, needed to solve
the game (i.e., to compute an equilibrium).
– LB : the lower-bound corresponding to the value of the best feasible solution
the algorithm managed to find before halting either due to convergence or
due to an elapsed time limit; by playing the strategy xn encoded in this
solution, the leader is guaranteed to obtain a utility equal to at least LB;
in the average, this value is only considered for instances where a feasible
solution is found.
– Gap: the additive gap of the returned solution, measured as UB - LB, where
UB is the upper-bound returned by the algorithm on the value of an op-
timal solution to the equilibrium-finding search problem. Note that, when
solving the two restricted formulations, i.e., the QCQP Formulation (5)
and the MILP Formulation (7), Gap corresponds to the gap “internal” to
the solution method, thus being, in general, not valid for the original, un-
restricted problem. This is not the case for BnB-sup and BnB-α, for which
Gap is a correct additive estimate of the difference between the best found
LB and the value of the supremum (overestimated by UB).
We also report, for each value of n and m, the following two figures:
– Opt: the percentage of instances solved to optimality. The figure is only re-
ported for BnB since, as previously explained, optimality cannot be guar-
anteed for the solutions to the two formulations.
– Feas: the percentage of instances for which a feasible solution has been
found. We report the figure for the two mathematical programming formu-
lations as an alternative to Opt.
The experiments are run on a UNIX machine with a total of 32 cores
working at 2.3 GHz, equipped with 128 GB of RAM. All the computations are
carried out on a single thread, with a time limit of 3600 seconds per instance.
7.1 Experimental Results with Two Followers
We report, first, the results obtained on games with two followers (i.e., with
n “ 3), which are summarized in Table 2. In particular, the table compares:
– QCQP;
– MILP with three values of M , namely, M “ 10, 100, 1000;
– BnB-sup;
– BnB-α, with three values of α, namely, α “ 0.1, 1, 10.
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Table 2 Experimental results for games with n “ 3 players. The figures are averaged over
games with the same values of m.
As the table shows, the QCQP formulation can be solved (not to global
optimality, as previously mentioned) only for instances with, at most, m “ 18
actions, due to BARON running out of memory on larger games. Further
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experimental results with a larger value of m are, thus, not reported. While,
with m ď 18, feasible solutions are found, on average, in 91% of the cases, their
quality is quite poor, as indicated by an additive gap equal to, on average, 34.6.
The running times are also extremely large, with the time limit being reached
on each instance, even those with m “ 4, with the sole exception of those with
m “ 18, on which the solver halted prematurely due to memory issues.
Empirically, the MILP formulation performs much better than the QCQP
one, allowing us to tackle instances with up to m “ 30 actions per player. The
best choice of M , out of the three that we have tested, seems to be M “ 10, for
which we obtain, on average, LBs of 68.2 and gaps of 28.7, with a computing
time slightly smaller than 2600 seconds. Although the percentage of instances
where a feasible solution has been found is slightly larger with M “ 1000
(97% as opposed to 94%), LBs and gap become slightly worse with M “ 1000,
possibly due to the fact that, as it is well-known, MILP solvers are typically
quite sensitive to the magnitude of “big M” coefficients which, if too large, are
likely to lead to large condition numbers, resulting in an algorithm which is
prone to numerical issues.
As to BnB-sup, the table clearly shows that this method substantially
outperforms the two mathematical programming formulations, being capable
of finding not just feasible solutions, but optimal ones for every game instance
with m ď 25, while solving to optimality 47% of the instances with m “ 30. We
register, on average, a computing time of 359 seconds, which further reduces
to 126 if we only consider the instances with m ď 25 (which are all solved to
optimality). Interestingly, BnB-sup shows that the supremum of the leader’s
utility is very large on the normal-form random games in our testbed, being
equal, on average on the instances with m ď 25 for which the supremum is
computed exactly, to 96.
As to BnB-α, we observe that the time taken by the method to find an α-
approximate strategy is, in essence, unaffected by the value of α, thus allowing
for the computation of α-approximate strategy extremely close, in value, to
the supremum, without requiring a too large computational effort. We remark
that, in the experiments, BnB-α is run only on instances with m ď 25 as, in
its implementation, BnB-α requires a relaxed outcome configuration on which
the value of the supremum has been attained to compute an α-approximate
strategy. As such, experiments on games where the supremum has not been
computed exactly would not give a correct solution. Note that one could,
nevertheless, easily modify BnB-α so to look for an α-approximate solution at
each leaf node, rather than after BnB-sup has halted. This way, if the method
halts due to the time limit being met, one would still obtain a solution which
is α-approximate w.r.t. the value of the best (LB) estimation of the supremum
that has been found within the time limit.
Table 3 reports further results obtained with BnB-sup for games with up
to m “ 70 actions per player. As the table shows, while some optimal solutions
can still be found for m “ 35, optimality is lost for any game instance with
m ě 40. Interestingly, though, BnB-sup still manages to find feasible solutions
for instances up to m “ 70. On average, the method obtains solutions with an
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Table 3 Results obtained with BnB-sup for games with n “ 3 players and 35 ď m ď 70.
BnB-sup
m Time LB Gap %Opt
35 3573 78.8 20.9 3
40 3560 63.1 36.8 0
45 3600 50.2 49.8 0
50 3600 48.8 51.2 0
55 3600 52.3 47.7 0
60 3600 48.9 51.1 0
65 3600 49.2 50.8 0
70 3600 49.1 50.9 0
average LB of 55.1 and an average additive gap of 44.9. Under the conservative
assumption that, in the testbed, games with 35 ď m ď 70 admit suprema of
value close to 100 (which is empirically true when m ď 30), BnB-sup provides,
on average, solutions that are less than 50% off of optimal ones.
7.2 Experimental Results with More Followers and Final Observations
Results obtained with BnB-sup with more than two followers (i.e., with n “
4, 5) are reported in Table 4 for m ď 14.
Table 4 Results obtained with BnB-sup for games with n “ 3, 4, 5 players and 4 ď m ď 70.
BnB-sup BnB-sup BnB-sup
n “ 3 n “ 4 n “ 5
m Time Gap Opt Time Gap Opt Time Gap Opt
4 0 0.0 100 3 0.0 100 8 0.0 100
6 2 0.0 100 17 0.0 100 137 0.0 100
8 5 0.0 100 126 0.0 100 2953 11.3 53
10 7 0.1 100 955 0.0 100 3461 45.0 13
12 15 0.0 100 2784 5.7 60 3600 52.9 0
14 20 0.1 100 3600 49.9 0 3600 51.8 0
16 53 0.0 100 - - - - - -
18 160 0.0 100 - - - - - -
20 222 0.1 100 - - - - - -
30 2687 3.8 47 - - - - - -
40 3560 36.8 0 - - - - - -
50 3600 51.2 0 - - - - - -
60 3600 51.1 0 - - - - - -
70 3600 50.9 0 - - - - - -
As the table illustrates, computing the value of the supremum of the
leader’s utility becomes very hard already for m “ 12 with n “ 4, for which
the algorithm manages to find optimal solution in only 60% of the cases. For
m “ 14, no instance is solved to optimality within the time limit. For n “ 5,
the problem becomes hard already for m “ 8, for which only 53% of the in-
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stances are solved to optimality, whereas, for m “ 12, no instances at all are
solved to optimality.
We do not report results on game instances with n “ 4, 5 and m ą 14 as
such games are so large that, on them, BnB-sup incurs memory problems due
to the MILP subproblems it solves.
In spite of the problem of computing a P-LFPNE being a nonconvex pes-
simistic bilevel program, with our branch-and-bound algorithm we can find
solutions with an optimality gap ď 0.01 for 3-player games with up to within
m “ 20 actions (containing three payoffs matrices with 8000 entries each),
which are comparable, in size, to those solved in previous works which solely
tackled the problem of computing a single NE maximising the social welfare,
see, e.g., [21].
8 Conclusions
We have shown that the problem of computing a pessimistic leader-follower
equilibrium with multiple followers playing pure strategies simultaneously and
noncooperatively is NP-hard with two or more followers and inapproximable in
polynomial time when the number of followers is three or more unless P “ NP.
We have proposed an exact single-level QCQP reformulation for the problem,
with a restricted version which we cast into an MILP, and an exact exponential-
time algorithm (which we have then embedded in a branch-and-bound scheme)
for finding the supremum of the leader’s utility and, in case there is no leader’s
strategy where such value is attained, also an α-approximate strategy.
Future developments include applications to structured games (e.g., con-
gestion games), establishing the approximability status of the problem with
two followers, and the generalization to the case with both leader and followers
playing mixed strategies—even though we conjecture that this problem could
be much harder, probably Σp2 -complete.
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